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ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: PREPARED FOR FUTURE TACTICAL  
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
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
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ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: PREPARED FOR FUTURE TACTICAL AND  
STRATEGIC MULTI-DISCIPLINED INTELLIGENCE TASKS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by  
JIMMIE L. SLADE, MAJ, USA  
B.S., North Carolina A&T State University, 1969

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1983

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Decisionmaking processes of the 1980's and 1990's will require intelligence that is based on both multi-disciplined collection systems and high quality analysis. Collection systems will be highly sophisticated and technical in order to support the advanced weaponry the AirLand Battle Doctrine requires. The need to reduce uncertainty in decisionmaking and the availability of vast quantities of information will make analysis and communications more important.

This thesis reveals that the effects of profession, technology, and the AirLand Battle Doctrine require the Army intelligence officer to gain a broad background in order to perform his decisionmaking task in the future. The study recommends that procedures be established and implemented by a central office to develop the Army intelligence officer into a broad military intelligence officer.

This study contains a significant bibliography.

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Approved by:

James E. Tucker, Thesis Committee Chairman  
LTC, JAMES E. TUCKER, M.A.

Joseph A. Schlatter, Member Graduate Faculty  
LTC, JOSEPH A. SCHLATTER, M.A.

William R. Larson, Member, Consulting Faculty  
COL, WILLIAM R. LARSON, Ph.D.

Accepted this 30th day of May 1983 by Philip J. Brooks  
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency.

**ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: PREPARED FOR FUTURE TACTICAL  
AND STRATEGIC MULTI-DISCIPLINED INTELLIGENCE TASKS?,  
by Major Jimmie L. Slade, USA, 120 pages.**

This study serves two purposes. First it examines strategic and tactical intelligence as a profession, the effects of technology on intelligence tasks, and the requirements of the AirLand Battle Doctrine on the Army intelligence officer. Secondly, the study provides some thoughts on the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to perform the essential multi-disciplined intelligence tasks vital to the 1980's and 1990's.

Foreign policy decisionmaking and tactical decisionmaking processes of the 1980's and 1990's will require intelligence that is based on both multi-disciplined collection systems and high quality analysis. Collection systems will be highly sophisticated and technical in order to support the advanced weaponry the AirLand Battle Doctrine requires. The need to reduce uncertainty in decisionmaking and the availability of vast quantities of information will make analysis more important. Also the volume of information exchanged between strategic and tactical activities and vice versa will drastically increase.

This thesis reveals that the effects of profession, technology and the AirLand Battle Doctrine require the Army intelligence officer to gain a broad background in order to perform his decisionmaking task in the future. The relationship between the decisionmaker and the Army intelligence officer remains the key to effective intelligence. The study recommends that procedures be established and implemented by a central office to develop the Army intelligence officer into a broad military intelligence officer.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy decisionmaking and tactical decision-making processes of the 1980's and 1990's will require intelligence that is based on both multi-disciplined collection systems and high quality analysis. Intelligence collection systems will be highly sophisticated and technical in order to support the advanced weaponry the AirLand Battle Doctrine requires. Strategic intelligence analysis will require that political, economic, scientific, and social factors be considered along with military factors. The need to reduce uncertainty in decisionmaking and the availability of vast quantities of information will make analysis more important. Also the volume of information exchanged between strategic and tactical activities and vice versa will drastically increase.

### Background

Military Intelligence has become a complex profession. The U.S. Army's Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Officer, hereafter referred to as the Army Intelligence Officer, is assigned broad duties. He is required to perform or manage multi-disciplined collection, production, and dissemination tasks in both strategic and tactical positions at all echelons

in support of Army and Department of Defense missions and requirements.<sup>1</sup>

Each component of multi-disciplined intelligence<sup>2</sup> is often a career field requiring its own special knowledge and skills. For example, signals intelligence consists of the two broad components, electronic intelligence and communication intelligence. The Army intelligence officer is not expected to have an in-depth knowledge of each component; however, he is expected to be familiar with the three intelligence disciplines--human intelligence, signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. As a minimum, the current Army intelligence officer must be familiar with both the strategic and tactical dimensions of each of the disciplines. If tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence were divided into two separate specialties, this would appear to simplify the training requirements, assignment procedures, and the tasks of the Army intelligence officer. But, would this enhance or degrade the intelligence function?

#### Purpose

This study serves two purposes. First it examines strategic and tactical intelligence as a profession, the effects of technology on intelligence tasks, and the requirements of the AirLand Battle Doctrine on the Army intelligence officer. Secondly, the study provides some thoughts on the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to perform the essential multi-disciplined intelligence tasks vital in the

1980's and 1990's.

### Problem

Is there a real need for the Army intelligence officer to work with information from multi-disciplined tactical and strategic sources concurrently or can this information be collected and used separately? Rather than two or three opinions on issues, the 1980's and 1990's may force analysis at the national level to include all the intelligence disciplines as well as political, economic, scientific, and social considerations while analysis at the tactical level will be based on data from all sources of information.<sup>3</sup> This information will not only come from U.S. Army sensors, it will often come from sensors of other services, joint and national sensors, and the sensors of allied nations. Conversely, "much of the intelligence that ultimately becomes strategic intelligence is collected and initially analyzed by intelligence officers and organizations of the Unified and Specified Commands, major commands of the military services, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and lower units."<sup>4</sup> Is there an interdependence between tactical and strategic intelligence? Will this interdependence increase or decrease in the future?

This exchange of information between tactical and strategic activities is not necessarily new, but the speed, diversity, and volume of the information flow combined with the relative importance attached to the information is

revolutionary. The rapid expansion and use of technology in the form of collection sensors, communications means and computer systems support the execution of the intelligence process. Technology itself may have become a major contributor to the diversity and complexity of intelligence tasks. In fact, the Study Group for the Review of Education and Training for Officers appointed in 1977 by the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, concluded that the most significant change of the 1990's will be the Army's response to the continuing introduction of new technology.<sup>5</sup> The Army intelligence officer will not only be concerned with the information from these systems, he must also be familiar with the capabilities of the actual technical systems. Examples of the systems he must understand include radars, signal intercept devices, imagery collectors, computers and communications systems. The officer's working relationship within the Department of Defense (DOD) will require him to have some degree of familiarity with the systems of the U.S. Army, other services, civilian intelligence agencies, as well as the systems of allied nations.

Overall, the proliferation of technology and the development of the AirLand Battle Doctrine along with the traditional mystifying characteristics of intelligence tasks emphasize the need for proper training and education of the Army intelligence officer. Today, the complexity and enormity of the intelligence functions call into question the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to fulfill

these varied tasks with the efficiency, speed, and accuracy the technology and weapon systems of the 1980's and 1990's demand. The effects of technology and the AirLand Battle Doctrine on the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to perform both strategic and tactical multi-disciplined intelligence tasks will be examined in this study. Considerable effort has been expended on the technical and organizational areas of intelligence production, but no corresponding effort has been devoted to the development of the intelligence officer.<sup>6</sup> It is difficult to assess the validity of the preceding statement due to the decentralization of intelligence training and education.

The training of the U.S. Army intelligence officer is divided among several different institutions and schools. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona trains military personnel to perform intelligence and security duties in the fields of combat intelligence, counterintelligence and area intelligence.<sup>7</sup> Tactical Signals Intelligence and Cryptography training is conducted at the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.<sup>8</sup> The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has the responsibility to "review, coordinate, and evaluate career development programs for military general intelligence career personnel."<sup>9</sup> DIA courses are open to military officers; however as this statement implies, DIA is not directed to train military officers in strategic intelligence subjects.



The National Security Agency (NSA) is the largest agency of the intelligence community in personnel. It "is a semiautonomous cryptologic agency of the Defense Department responsible principally for monitoring foreign communications and other signals for analysis by other agencies. NSA is also responsible for protecting the security of U.S. communications."<sup>10</sup> NSA has drawn officers primarily from the cryptologic elements of the military services since its creation by executive order in November 1952. Although the Secretary of Defense exercises executive authority over all NSA operations, little unclassified information exists about the specific role of NSA in the training of military officers.<sup>11</sup>

In 1952 the Brownell Committee provided recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on how to insure the most secure and effective conduct of the communications intelligence activities of the United States. The training of military officers was left unclear at that time.<sup>12</sup> The committee's report stated that the Presidential Memorandum, which was also prepared by the committee, "should further provide that the Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he finds essential to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel. . .will remain with the department. . .providing them."<sup>13</sup> As the committee report states, "The Presidential Memorandum which presumably formed today's National Security Agency remains

classified."<sup>14</sup>

Although information about NSA activities including personnel matters is classified, current official documents continue to show that NSA controls the planning, programming, budgeting, and expenditure of resources involved in cryptologic activities.<sup>15</sup> The training of cryptologic personnel, therefore, comes under the purview of NSA.<sup>16</sup> Any proposed substantive change to the training of intelligence officers that involves cryptologic training, may be in opposition to the authority granted the Director NSA by the 1952 Presidential Memorandum. This fact must be considered in any discussion of multi-disciplined training of military intelligence officers.<sup>17</sup>

Together the above schools, agencies, and other institutions offer a wide variety of intelligence training. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army monitors the career development of the Army intelligence officer.<sup>18</sup> However no one agency, school, or office is empowered to determine what training and education an Army intelligence officer must have to perform both tactical and strategic multi-disciplined intelligence functions and to establish a concomitant program or system of schooling to fulfill those requirements.

#### Methodology and Scope

Does this decentralized schooling and training system develop the Army intelligence officer who is oriented and

prepared to fulfill the strategic and tactical multi-disciplined intelligence needs of the U.S. Army in the 1980's and 1990's? What are those needs? This thesis will examine the requirements that govern the education and training standards of the Army intelligence officer. In order to do this, it is necessary to briefly review the concept of military intelligence as a profession. The consequence of technology on intelligence functions will also be reviewed. The U.S. Army's Operational Concept known as the AirLand Battle Doctrine will be studied to determine what requirements it places on the Army intelligence officer. Precise conclusions about these issues are not possible. However an examination of relevant unclassified materials provides some insight into the direction the U.S. Army is moving and how this affects the professional development of the Army intelligence officer.

This thesis will be constrained in that classified material will not be used. Therefore, classified reference material will not be consulted. Moreover this study only considers military requirements. It is acknowledged that several Army intelligence officers are assigned outside of the Department of Defense to other agencies and organizations, such as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Any discussion of preparations for these positions will be coincidental.

### Terms

For clarity it is important to define some of the terms associated with the concept of intelligence. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, provided the following useful definitions of information, combat information and intelligence.

In intelligence usage, information is unevaluated material of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.

Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user tactical intelligence requirements.

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.<sup>19</sup>

This study examines two major categories of intelligence, strategic and tactical. Strategic intelligence is "intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels."<sup>20</sup>

Harry H. Ransom in his book, The Intelligence Establishment, offers a descriptive definition which is more useful to the analysis in this thesis.

Strategic intelligence is the broadest in scope. It refers to information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of foreign nations required by planners in establishing the basis for an adequate national security policy in peacetime. It includes both long-range forecasts of political, economic, and military trends and early warning of

impending political or military actions. It also provides the basis for projected over-all military operations in time of war.<sup>21</sup>

The distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence is becoming more blurred each day as partially revealed by their definitions. Tactical intelligence is "Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations."<sup>22</sup>

A close look at the definitions of strategic and tactical intelligence reveals the relative nature of the two categories. Any attempt to define the two terms based on who or where the information is collected adds too rather than lessens the confusion about their actual meaning. This is especially true at the Army corps level for generally this is the first level of command where information from strategic and tactical systems are brought together.<sup>23</sup> The true distinction between the definition of strategic and tactical intelligence is in its use. "Tactical intelligence is used to make operational decisions in the field while strategic intelligence is used at the national, international, and perhaps theater level."<sup>24</sup>

This study will address both strategic and tactical intelligence. Chapter II will contain a review of related literature and an assessment of the concept of military intelligence as a profession. Chapter III will review technology, intelligence and decisionmaking. Chapter IV will examine the AirLand Battle Doctrine and provide some

thoughts on the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer. Chapter V will offer conclusions and recommendations.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, Army Pamphlet 600-3 Officer Professional Development and Utilization (1977), 48-1. Chapter 48 contains a description of the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Specialty (Specialty Code 35). That description is included in Appendix A to this study.

<sup>2</sup>Multi-disciplined refers to the three intelligence disciplines of human intelligence, signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. Each of these disciplines can be further divided into more specific components.

<sup>3</sup>Richard H. Giza, "The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates, ed. Roy Godson (1980), 200.

<sup>4</sup>Dallas C. Brown, Jr., "Strategic Intelligence The Army Role," Military Intelligence 6(April-June 1980), 7.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Army, A Review of Education and Training for Officers (5 vols., 1978), 1, III-5.

<sup>6</sup>Stan Lee T. Fulcher, "On Developing the Human Element in Military Intelligence," Military Intelligence 5(July-September 1979), 32.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Branch, "The Role of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security" Paper undated, est. 1966, 14.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Regulation No 23-1, DOD Intelligence Career Development Program (1981), 1.

<sup>10</sup>Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (hereafter cited as the Murphy Commission) Final Report, June 1975, 94.

<sup>11</sup>John Prados, The Soviet Estimate U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (1982), 27.

<sup>12</sup>George A. Brownell, The Origins and Development of the National Security Agency (1981), v.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 68 and 69.

- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., 76.
- <sup>15</sup>U.S. Army, The Department of the Army Manual (1982), 2-11.
- <sup>16</sup>DIA Regulation No 23-1, 1.
- <sup>17</sup>Brownell, Origins of NSA, 68.
- <sup>18</sup>Department of Army Manual, 8-10.
- <sup>19</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1979). Other related terms are provided in the glossary in Appendix C of this study.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup>Henry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (1970), 13.
- <sup>22</sup>JCS Pub 1.
- <sup>23</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence)(Division) (1981), 1-12.
- <sup>24</sup>Brown, "Strategic Intelligence Army Role" 6.



## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AS A PROFESSION

#### Review of the Literature

Since World War II, several unclassified works have been written concerning the role and the activities of strategic intelligence; however, comprehensive unclassified writings on tactical intelligence during this period are scarce. The few comprehensive works prepared on tactical intelligence appear to have been authored by combat arms officers. These authors might have considered themselves to be intelligence officers, but this is difficult to determine since intelligence was not established as a separate branch within the Army until 1962.<sup>1</sup> Thus, these authors retained their status as members of the combat arms profession while working as intelligence officers. It is difficult to speculate about what effect branch affiliation may have had on their works, but one point is obvious. As combat arms officers, their writings provide a vitally needed perspective of what intelligence must be and do to fulfill both the peacetime and combat needs of the U.S. Army.

#### Writings on Tactical Intelligence

The prominent tactical intelligence works include Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War by Lieutenant

Colonel Walter C. Sweeney; Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission by Major Edwin E. Schwien; S-2 In Action by Lieutenant Colonel Shipley Thomas; Intelligence is for Commanders by Colonels Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson; Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence by Colonel Elias Carter Townsend; and Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare by Lieutenant Colonel Irving Heymont.

Walter Sweeney, an infantry officer with extensive experience in military intelligence, published his book in 1924. He stated that the line officers heading the intelligence organizations from division level up to the War Department must be trained General Staff Officers with intelligence experts and specialists under their supervision. Line officers performing intelligence duties at brigade and battalion levels should simply be trained by their respective commanders. Sweeney observed that officers were detailed to intelligence for two reasons; to keep up with scientific improvements in technical and special weapons, and to relieve the demand modern war created on the commander's time and energy. Furthermore, Sweeney suggested that three types of intelligence existed: War Department Intelligence, Combat Intelligence, and G. H. Q. (general headquarters) Intelligence. The first two were categorized based on their use by the War Department and tactical units, respectively. The latter G. H. Q. Intelligence, contained both War Department and Combat Intelligence within its scope.

During the post World War I era, Sweeney described the

Intelligence Service as a weapon of war which should concentrate only on its duty and not be dissipated by dispersion to things that do not contribute directly to keeping track of the enemy. The G-2 must be knowledgeable of his own forces and must check out proposed orders from the enemy point of view. Confidence in his ability to perform his duty, plus experience and training as a line officer were the primary requisites for a General Staff Officer for Intelligence. Sweeney recognized the need for specialization among high level analysts, foreign language translators, and personnel involved in counter-espionage and codes and ciphers assignments.

An instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from 1932 to 1936, Edwin Schwien described the principal role of the commander as making decisions. Therefore, the commander must have solid intelligence about the enemy and the area of operation or his decisions will be only a gamble. In his book which was published in 1936, Schwien asserted that the use of probable intentions in estimates is fallacious. He emphasized that information that describes the enemy capabilities is needed for use in planning operations, not intentions. The task of intelligence with its various collection agencies is to collect only essential information about the capabilities of the enemy. Schwien used battles fought by the French against the Germans in 1914 to support and demonstrate this thesis. Moreover, Schwien emphasized the importance of training and concluded

that intelligence officers should be trained during peacetime in quantity so they would be available at battalion level and above when war starts.

Shipley Thomas, a military intelligence officer in the Army reserve, published his book in 1940. Thomas emphasized that intelligence developed by front line S-2's is primary and all other intelligence is supplementary. He glorified the regimental S-2 position and asserted that outguessing the enemy was more fascinating than physically fighting.

Robert Glass and Phillip Davidson, members of the staff and faculty at the Command and General Staff College following World War II published their book in 1948. The book was written to assist post World War II commanders in making decisions. Methodology including the intelligence process, the study of weather and terrain, counterintelligence procedures and intelligence forms were stressed.

Elias Townsend, an infantry officer, wrote his book in 1955. His book was a critical analysis of the then current combat intelligence doctrine. By Townsend's analysis, the divergence between the intelligence officer and the commander was created by the intelligence officer's thinking in terms of probable enemy capabilities while the commander thought in terms of risks. He emphasized determining the location and strength of the enemy and from these facts the enemy capabilities. Townsend argued that the commander, not the intelligence officer should be permitted to publish an estimate. The task of intelligence is then to cut through the

barrier of indicators to determine the true location and strength of the enemy.

Irving Heymont, also an infantry officer and instructor at the Command and General Staff College from 1956 to 1960, published his book in 1960. Heymont covered the intelligence sources and the intelligence process in his book Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare. Additionally, he included a discussion of the national intelligence organizations.

Each of the above writings emphasized the relationship between the intelligence officer and the commander. They stress the inextricable nature of intelligence to decision-making in combat and the development of tactical plans. Further analysis of this relationship is needed to clarify its proper function and capability on the highly technical and lethal battlefield of the 1980's and 1990's.

Comprehensive writings on tactical intelligence seemingly dropped after 1962. The emphasis shifted from books to articles published in professional journals and other periodicals. These articles seriously discussed the topic of tactical intelligence, but by their limited nature, could not provide the depth the topic deserves.

Meanwhile it appeared that writings on strategic intelligence continued to be published in books, professional journals and other periodicals. This is not to imply that scholarly books were not written concerning tactical intelligence but the emphasis appeared to shift toward professional military intelligence being the domain of strategic intelligence.

## Writings on Strategic Intelligence

A short listing of a few of the works published since 1962 reflects their strategic intelligence orientation.<sup>2</sup>

The Craft of Intelligence by Allen W. Dulles was published in 1963. This work is an analysis of the intelligence profession. It is primarily concerned with intelligence at the strategic level.

The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing by David Kahn was published in 1967. This is the most authoritative book published on communications intelligence. Tactical intelligence is included but strategic intelligence is emphasized.

In 1969, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick wrote Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II. This work discusses why intelligence failed in five military battles in World War II. It is an analysis of strategic intelligence. This statement is true if the definition of strategic intelligence stated in Chapter I is accepted. Even then the categorization is not clear cut. That definition emphasized that intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels is strategic intelligence. The decisions concerning the battles in this book were generally made at the national level.

Harry Howe Ransom wrote The Intelligence Establishment. Published in 1970, the book is a balanced and scholarly discussion of how the intelligence community looks from the

outside. It concerns only strategic intelligence.

A work about strategic intelligence, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities, was published in 1973. The author Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. did a survey of the intelligence community, its history, and role in national policy.

Stephen E. Ambrose published Ike's Spies in 1981. The book describes the relationship between this decisionmaker and his intelligence officers in both military and national policy situations. This book is also concerned with strategic intelligence.

This short listing omits many publications concerning organizations and special operations. Two notable works on tactical intelligence since 1962 are listed below.

G-2. Intelligence for Patton by Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays was published in 1971. This book describes the working of tactical intelligence, particularly as it relates to decisionmaking.

The Evolution of American Military Intelligence by Marc E. Powe and Edward E. Wilson was published in 1973. This book is a historical review of American Military Intelligence and contains several interesting anecdotes about some of the individuals that shaped this history.

The review of the above literature indicates that strategic intelligence has been emphasized more than tactical intelligence in scholarly written works. Also, tactical intelligence was seldom discussed in conjunction with the

concept of profession. Authors of tactical intelligence works seemed to concentrate on what intelligence must accomplish and paid little attention to a possible relationship between intelligence and profession. In the remainder of this chapter, the concept of profession and its possible influence on the military intelligence officer's propensity to seek strategic and tactical assignments will be discussed.

### Military Intelligence as a Profession

Is a military intelligence officer a member of a profession? Is military intelligence a profession within the military? Does an intelligence officer's attitude toward what constitutes a profession have a bearing on his preference for strategic or tactical positions?

Samuel P. Huntington may be the most widely accepted authority on the subject of the military officer as a member of a profession. He is author of the book The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. The book was published in 1957. Chapter I, "Officership as a Profession," is a key reading assignment in the history instruction phase at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.<sup>3</sup> His theory, therefore, is becoming well known by the officers who will become part of the Army's general officer grades in the 1980's and 1990's.

According to Huntington, "A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics."<sup>4</sup> This definition could apply to many vocations; however, "The distinguishing characteristic of a profession as a special



type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."<sup>5</sup> Expertise for the military officer is defined as "the management of violence." This skill is further defined as "The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence." This separates the military officer from his civilian counterpart.<sup>6</sup> A strict interpretation of this criteria also excludes military officers who are not leaders of combat troops. Therefore, this would probably exclude military intelligence officers as well as the majority of the other officer specialties from the body of the corps who form the military profession.

Huntington does not establish a minimum time that the officer must serve as a "manager of violence" to qualify as a member of the profession. It is therefore logical to inquire if the military intelligence officer detailed to a combat arms position is a member of the officer profession during the period of his detail? Also in a situation where an intelligence officer searches, identifies, and confirms the location of an enemy position for the explicit purpose of targeting that position and people for destruction; is he then involved in the direction or control phase of "the management of violence?" As the range capabilities of both intelligence sensors and weapon systems improve will this distinction still be clear? For example, a concept is currently being considered that may give the military the capability to use radar to locate enemy tanks at 80 to 160

kilometers behind the enemy front lines, and destroy them with a medium range missile launched from either the air or ground.<sup>7</sup> This concept and the effects of technology will be covered in Chapter III. The management of secret wars also makes unclear the issue of whether or not the military intelligence officer is already involved in "the management of violence." In recommending that all officers commissioned in Military Intelligence serve a one year combat arms detail the Review of Education and Training for Officers analysts used as part of their supporting rationale that, "Other than the G3/S3, the G2/S2 is the staff element which most actively participates in the planning of unit combat operations."<sup>8</sup>

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that if there is tolerance in Huntington's interpretation of who are the managers of violence, then the military intelligence officer would be among the first of the combat support officers to qualify.

In his book The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society, Sam C. Sarkesian agrees with Huntington on several points. The book was published in 1975. Sarkesian agrees that a profession requires members to have special knowledge and education and to be capable of performing a unique service for society based on a certain expertise. They must also have a continuing system of education to maintain a certain level of competence. He also agrees that the profession controls entry into the profession and the training of potential

professionals.<sup>9</sup> Sarkesian emphasizes commitment to the profession and concludes that an officer becomes a professional when he decides to stay in the military beyond his initial obligation.<sup>10</sup> He emphasized the humanistic viewpoint and subordinates the aspects of violence.<sup>11</sup>

Other elements of a profession can be drawn from the following statements taken from both Huntington and Sarkesian's works. "The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The client of every profession is society...."<sup>12</sup> Members of a profession have a calling and commitment to society.<sup>13</sup>

The members of a profession share a sense of corporate-ness. This sense of unity originates in their training and is fostered by shared working experiences.<sup>14</sup> The military profession is bureaucratized and the right to practice the profession is limited to those who have been commissioned.<sup>15</sup>

In assessing the applicability of the theories of Huntington and Sarkesian to the military officer of the 1980's and 1990's it must be remembered that their works were each authored after this country was involved in limited wars that caused considerable questioning of the professionalism of the military officer. Huntington's work was published in 1957 and bears a connection to the Korean War and the controversies between senior military leaders and senior political leaders during and following that war. Sarkesian's

work was published in 1975 and is by the author's own words an outgrowth of his experiences in Vietnam.<sup>16</sup>

Prior to Huntington's development, the theory of the military intelligence officer as a member of a profession and the concept of intelligence as a profession often appeared in writings and professional literature. Sherman Kent's classic book, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, was first published in 1949. In assessing the improvements in intelligence resulting from World War II, he characterized intelligence as a profession.<sup>17</sup> By this time, American military intelligence had made major strides from its meager beginnings in 1885. During the 1800's the Military Information Division of the Adjutant General's Office consisted of one officer and one clerk who were detailed to file intelligence reports.<sup>18</sup> By World War II, the military officer was preeminent in the field of intelligence. In fact, it was Huntington who pointed out that during World War II the military services created full political and economic intelligence staffs. The Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the principal coordinator of the national intelligence of the services, Office of Strategic Services better known as OSS, State Department, and the Foreign Economic Administration.<sup>19</sup>

Before continuing, it may be necessary to provide some explanation for two points that may appear as inconsistencies in the preceding statements. Those two points concern the timing between the establishment of the OSS and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the presence of political and economic intelligence staffs within a military organization. The interesting arrangement of the military services containing political and economic intelligence elements grew out of several organizational changes. These changes also reflect the historical closeness of the military and intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not a formal organization during World War II. Instead the Joint Chiefs of Staff evolved as a way of overcoming the inter-service problems America experienced as the U.S. military and government conducted combined planning with the British.

In 1942 Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of staff to the President began chairing a series of meetings that crystallized for the rest of the war into what became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>20</sup> When the Joint Chiefs of Staff was pulled together in February 1942 a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was formed to provide coordinated intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As stated earlier, "Members of the JIC included representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service (Army), Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence), Department of State, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Foreign Economic Administration."<sup>21</sup>

Appointed in 1941 as Coordinator of Information, Colonel (later Major General) William J. Donovan was tasked to collect and analyze strategic intelligence for global war. His unit was located in the War Department, but reported

directly to the President.<sup>22</sup> This was changed when the Office of Strategic Services was formally created on June 13, 1942 by Presidential order. Shortly thereafter the Office of Strategic Services was placed under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which had not yet been formally organized.<sup>23</sup>

On January 22, 1946, President Truman issued an Executive Order establishing the Central Intelligence Group.<sup>24</sup> The relationships of these organizations were formally altered and the military and intelligence closeness institutionalized by the National Security Act of 1947. This act provided for a National Military Establishment consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Departments. It continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus first formally recognizing this organization. To link the National Military Establishment to the formulation of national policy the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board. The Central Intelligence Agency would coordinate the intelligence activities of various government departments and report and make recommendations to the National Security Council.<sup>25</sup> Although the need for central intelligence was recognized by President Truman and others, the federation of the intelligence community prevailed over a central organization.<sup>26</sup>

The inclination of the intelligence community toward a federation influenced and still influences the development of intelligence schooling and personnel policies. This

inclination toward federation may explain the fact that Sherman Kent's post World War II recommendations to enhance intelligence as a profession were not uniformly accepted. In his book, Kent defined intelligence as "an institution... a physical organization of living people which pursues the special kind of knowledge at issue."<sup>27</sup> In further describing the expertise required of the intelligence officer, Kent concluded that the intelligence organization must have people capable of research and rigorous thought to hold professional jobs as well as the devoted specialist.<sup>28</sup> Kent therefore urged the Central Intelligence Agency to become involved in policing the Departments, including State, Army, Navy and Air Force by taking an active part in seeing that the proper people were recruited and trained for departmental intelligence.<sup>29</sup>

Kent concluded that strategic intelligence is one of the phenomena of war and peace which has advanced in complexity with all the other machines and techniques. "It is a specialty of the highest order that requires that the services properly recruit, train, and reward personnel who make a career of it."<sup>30</sup>

In 1957, Brigadier General (Retired) Washington Platt wrote the book Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles. He emphasized that creative thinking and intelligence production have similar conditions and pitfalls. He suggested that logic, the theory of probability and the methods of social sciences are applicable with modification

to intelligence production.<sup>31</sup> In 1957, the same year that Huntington's theory of the military officer as a profession was published, Platt examined intelligence using the same model that Huntington used. Platt concluded that intelligence fills the specifications of a learned profession in the mission, type of operations, level of ability required of personnel, and possibilities for progress in fundamental principles and methods. However, it was deficient in graduate degrees in the professional subject commonly found among members, professional associations, sense of professional unity, progressive spirit as a profession and special privileges and responsibilities recognized by law. Moreover, tactical intelligence and intelligence production were behind the other fields within intelligence.<sup>32</sup> Platt concluded that intelligence is becoming a profession in the United States and has only one client--the U.S. Government.<sup>33</sup>

Some of the deficiencies outlined by Platt have been remedied or at least decreased since the publication of his book. Following the Vietnam War, new emphasis was placed on getting intelligence recognized as a profession in the United States at large and the results appear favorable.<sup>34</sup> The intelligence community has a broad academic program including the Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence offered by the Defense Intelligence School.<sup>35</sup> However the intelligence schools remain fragmented as outlined in Chapter I.

Another encouraging development is the indication that



the close association between the intelligence and academic communities is being restored. In April 1979, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was developed by a group of social scientists. The stated purposes of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence are to encourage teaching on both the graduate and undergraduate levels in the field of intelligence; to promote the development of a theory of intelligence; to encourage research into the intelligence process itself; and to study the tensions between intelligence activities and the democratic and constitutional values of our society. Although the organization's membership consists of political scientists, particularly specialists in international relations and U.S. foreign policy, historians, sociologists and professors of international and constitutional law, the participants in the colloquium form an impressive listing of military intelligence officers as well.<sup>36</sup> Restoring the closeness between intelligence and academe can benefit both communities particularly in language training and basic area research.<sup>37</sup>

Intelligence has an impressive body of professional literature, a growing number of professional journals and four professional organizations that support the concept of intelligence as a profession.<sup>38</sup> The National Military Intelligence Association relates closely to the Army intelligence officer. It was established in 1974 and initially consisted of only Army personnel. As of September 1982, the National Military Intelligence Association had 1400

members. Active duty Army officers remain the largest group in the association with 522 members.<sup>39</sup>

Tactical intelligence has also made great strides since the publication in 1957 of Platt's examination of intelligence. Major General Thompson, former Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, remarked in 1981 that the creation within the U.S. Army of a professional tactical intelligence system is well on the way to fruition.<sup>40</sup> His earlier statements in 1979 also reflected an appreciation for the dual nature of intelligence when he stated, "Simultaneously, we must instill pride based on the importance of our profession. . . ." Intelligence personnel "are soldiers first, intelligence professionals second to none."<sup>41</sup>

The military intelligence officer's attitude toward what constitutes a profession will influence his preference for strategic or tactical positions. Huntington's concept of officership as a profession revolves around the particular expertise of managing violence whereas Sarkesian emphasizes lasting commitment to the military profession. Kent's concept of intelligence as a profession is centered on the requirement that members be capable of research and rigorous thought in the pursuit of the special kind of knowledge at issue. Intelligence as a learned profession and the level of ability required of members is stressed by Platt.

According to Huntington, military intelligence is not a profession within the military because the military

intelligence officer's expertise is not the "management of violence." According to Sarkesian, a military intelligence officer is a member of the profession of military officers if he has a lasting commitment to military officership.

Current thinking within the Army also emphasizes the importance of commitment to institutional values.<sup>42</sup> The coordinating draft of the Army's new manual on military leadership highlights the importance of ideals when it says "American military professionals...are not simply...managers of violence."<sup>43</sup> Thus commitment to the institution as Sarkesian emphasized may be more useful today as a characteristic of a profession than being a manager of violence as Huntington suggested. It is projected that "the Army officer of the 1990's will need commitment, for this quality is an excellent predictor of the officer's eventual contribution to society, even more so than intelligence and knowledge."<sup>44</sup>

Based on the theories of Kent, Sarkesian, Platt and the comments by General Thompson, one can conclude that military intelligence officers are members of the intelligence profession and the profession of military officers. Military intelligence officers fulfill a unique need of both the military and society at large. Their duties require lasting commitment to the military and the U.S. Government. Their complex intelligence duties require research and rigorous thought to fulfill both military and governmental missions.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Don Gordon "CEWI Battalion: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare on the Battlefield," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 22.

<sup>2</sup>Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (1973), 196 and 198. Much of the information contained in this listing was taken from the bibliography of this work.

<sup>3</sup>Robert H. Berlin, ed., 20th Century War: The American Experience (1982), 71.

<sup>4</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (1957), 2.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>7</sup>"Assault Breaker System Moves Ahead," Army Times, January 10, 1983, 23.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. Army, A Review of Education and Training for Officers (5 vols., 1978), 4, x-xii-2

<sup>9</sup>Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (1975), 11.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>12</sup>Huntington, Soldier and State, 9.

<sup>13</sup>Sarkesian, Professional Army Officer, 13.

<sup>14</sup>Huntington, Soldier and State, 10.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 16.

<sup>16</sup>Sarkesian, Professional Army Officer, xi.

<sup>17</sup>Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949), xv.

<sup>18</sup>Marc B. Powe and Edward E. Wilson, The Evolution of American Military Intelligence (1973), 10.

<sup>19</sup>Huntington, Soldier and State, 434.

<sup>20</sup>Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), 457.

<sup>21</sup>Harry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (1970), 62.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 67.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 79 and 80.

<sup>25</sup>Weigley, History U.S. Army, 493.

<sup>26</sup>Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, 81.

<sup>27</sup>Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 69.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 74.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 94.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 113.

<sup>31</sup>Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles (1957), 47.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 250 and 253.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 267.

<sup>34</sup>Richard W. Bates, "The Intelligence Profession," The American Intelligence Journal 4(May 1982), 19.

<sup>35</sup>National Military Intelligence Association, "NMIA Salutes the First Graduates of the Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence Program," The American Intelligence Journal 4(Summer 1981), 5.

<sup>36</sup>Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection (1982), 223.

<sup>37</sup>Richard W. Bates, "Intelligence and Academe: Estranged Communities," The American Intelligence Journal 4(Summer 1981), 12. For further discussion on this issue, see Robert DeGross, "An Academe View of the Problem," The American Intelligence Journal 4(Summer 1981), 14-16 and Bruce Watson, "Intelligence and Academe: A Third View," The American Intelligence Journal 4(January 1982), 19-23.

<sup>38</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Intelligence Profession" 20.

<sup>39</sup>Charles E. Thomann, Executive Director National Military Intelligence Association to author, 6 January 1983.

<sup>40</sup>Edmund R. Thompson, "The Importance of a Professional Intelligence Discipline," Signal 35(March 1981), 57.

<sup>41</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The Challenge of MI Leadership in the 80's," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 50.

<sup>42</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-1, The Army (1981), 23.

<sup>43</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100 Coordinating Draft, Military Leadership (1983), 4-10.

<sup>44</sup>U.S. Army, RETO Study, P-M-1-1.

## CHAPTER III

### TECHNOLOGY, INTELLIGENCE AND DECISIONMAKING

Technology affects the performance of the intelligence function in both positive and negative ways. Probably the most dramatic area witnessing rapid technological change is our achievements in near and outer space.<sup>1</sup> The importance of space systems particularly attack warning and surveillance systems to the maintenance of our national defense and to fulfill the combat commanders increasing need for information was underscored by the U.S. Air Force's creation in September 1982 of Space Command as a major command.<sup>2</sup>

The Air Force is planning several ambitious space programs to be operated by the Space Command in the 1980's and beyond. "It is the hope and belief of the Air Force that SPACECOM will evolve into a unified command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Command Plan."<sup>3</sup>

Another area of rapid technological growth is brought on by advances in the electronic chip and its affect on the use of radars, optics, computers, communications devices, and weapon systems. Dr. James P. Wade, Jr., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has likened the revolution brought on by the electronic chip

to the revolution in warfare brought on by gunpowder and the application of atomic energy.<sup>4</sup>

As stated at the outset, technology can be both positive and negative. Just the investigation of new principles by an adversary can make current weapon systems obsolete.<sup>5</sup> Some would go as far as to conclude that a "technological breakthrough" by an adversary can be decisive of itself.<sup>6</sup> This may be an overstatement but it does not detract from the need for intelligence to predict or detect a technological breakthrough by an adversary early enough to permit the development of a countermeasure.

Technology can make the acquisition of intelligence indicators clearer or permit the adversary to make these indicators more ambiguous. History shows that the occurrence of the latter is more likely, and living up to the task of responding to ambiguous warning will be the true test in the future.<sup>7</sup> Technology can permit decisions to be communicated more quickly, but this tends to reduce the time available for decisions which again can have positive or negative results.<sup>8</sup>

#### Intelligence and Decisionmaking

In order to examine the relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking, it is necessary to again call attention to the definition of intelligence. The definition contained in Chapter I is somewhat limited in this regard since it concerns primarily the product. The definition offered by Kent is more useful for this chapter and the



preceding chapter. Intelligence is ". . .a kind of knowledge. . . ." It is . . .type of organization. . . ."9 More than that intelligence is a ". . .process. . . ."10 This chapter looks at intelligence as the process of decisionmaking, collecting, and analyzing. Communicating is involved throughout the intelligence process.

The intelligence process is continuous. Likewise, "decisionmaking is a continual process involving interpersonal relationships from top to bottom in any organization." The decisionmaking process, as described by the military, includes recognizing the problem and gathering pertinent available information. Courses of action are then developed, analyzed and compared. From this process, the best course of action is selected and becomes the decision. This decision is then communicated to those concerned with its execution. During the last phase of the decisionmaking process, information of changing situations is obtained, and based on this information, the decision is modified as needed.<sup>11</sup> At this point, or sooner in the process, the cycle begins to repeat itself.

Decisionmaking is generally categorized as occurring under the conditions of certainty, risk, and uncertainty.<sup>12</sup> Decisionmaking in both the formulation and execution of strategy as well as the development and execution of military operations normally occur under conditions of uncertainty and risk. Decisionmaking under uncertainty is more complex than under the condition of risk because the outcome cannot

be determined in advance. Clearly decisionmaking under uncertainty is a gamble.<sup>13</sup>

The role of intelligence in decisionmaking, therefore, is to reduce uncertainty in intelligence information to a level where decisions can be made under the condition of risk.<sup>14</sup> Accomplishing this task has long been recognized as being more difficult than the textbooks indicate. In his 1832 work On War, the great military theorist Karl Von Clausewitz clearly stated the essence of the problem. "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain."<sup>15</sup>

Leadership manuals outline the military leader's role in decisionmaking; however, the relationship between the leader and the intelligence officer in tactical decisionmaking is not closely examined in old or emerging leadership manuals.<sup>16</sup> Both tactical decisionmakers and intelligence officers can benefit from the lessons learned in the strategic or national decisionmaking process.

The following definition helps clarify the concepts of information and uncertainty. "Uncertainty is defined as the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by the organization."<sup>17</sup> Uncertainty resulting from insufficient information about the situation at hand and inadequate knowledge needed to assess the consequences of available options add to the stress of decisionmaking.<sup>18</sup> Decisionmakers may attempt to avoid this stress by obtaining

more information, particularly when one considers the apparent increased information-gathering capabilities technology provides and the inclination of an "information society" to demand high quantities of data. However, this practice of obtaining more information creates its own problems. The use of technology to fulfill a high proportion of actual and perceived demands has already created a glut of information which threatens to overload both the analysis process and the communications means to transmit the collected information. The desire to remove uncertainty can also increase costs in both collection and analysis due to the extra efforts required to confirm a greater percentage of the data and to refine the analysis. These problems will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

It is sufficient here to state that in pursuing intelligence a distinction must be made between the knowable and the unknowable and between what can be predicted with reasonable certainty and what can only be expressed in degree of probability.<sup>19</sup> Intelligence has the potential to determine decisions, but knowing all the relevant facts does not necessarily eliminate the need for hard choices.<sup>20</sup> Technology can lead the decisionmaker to expect the intelligence officer to be capable of removing uncertainty through the use of technical devices such as near real-time sensors and computers, which adds to the complexity of the intelligence tasks.

Technology may offer the decisionmaker the illusion that he can more efficiently obtain his required intelligence directly from the appropriate electronic source without the delay of an intelligence officer filtering the collected information. Or the decisionmaker may obtain intelligence information from sources other than the intelligence officer. The strategic intelligence officer competes with media and other information sources in influencing the strategic decisionmakers; while, the commander or decisionmaker's receptivity to the tactical intelligence officer's reports is affected by the information the tactical decisionmaker receives from other sources.<sup>21</sup> In both cases the decisionmaker's receipt of information from these other sources may result in him obtaining a truer picture of the actual situation. Since this information is not normally processed, it can conversely obscure the true situation and slow down the decisionmaking process or the action resulting from the decision.

Intelligence is usually considered valuable during combat, but how important is intelligence during periods of noncombat? Today, it is sometimes argued that the United States is already engaged in a "Technological War" with the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> In a "Technological War" reliable intelligence is needed for longer range planning to reveal the capabilities and technological trends of the opponent. It is the intelligence community which provides this input to the strategic analyst as well as the policy decisionmakers.

Therefore intelligence is still one of the most important functions in a "Technological War."<sup>23</sup> Even without accepting the current existence of a "Technological War" the substantive burden of military intelligence has grown as new nuclear and conventional weapons evolve and as force structures grow in complexity.<sup>24</sup> Therefore intelligence, particularly strategic intelligence, may always be considered as "at war." As stated earlier the undetected development of a technological breakthrough by a potential adversary can determine the difference between victory and defeat.

Few would question the fact that strategic intelligence is vital during periods of noncombat. But, how important is tactical intelligence during this period of noncombat? What should be the principal concerns of Army intelligence officers in tactical units during noncombat periods? What activities prepare them for participation in the decision-making process during combat in the 1980's and 1990's?

Even though intelligence today has broadened, intelligence systems remain heavily oriented on military consideration and upon discovering and evaluating potential military threats.<sup>25</sup> It would seem logical to expect the Army intelligence officer at the tactical level to also be oriented toward developing procedures to discover and evaluate potential military threats to his organization. Also, some argue that the training in intelligence analysis often provided in today's training environment does not prepare intelligence personnel for the uncertainties that will exist during combat.<sup>26</sup>

Overcoming these obstacles and developing procedures to execute the intelligence tasks in combat should be challenging undertakings for the Army intelligence officer in a tactical organization. In reality this may not be the situation.

Some junior Army intelligence officers in tactical units express a feeling of frustration because the duties they perform do not resemble their perception of combat duties or the description of the job reflected in field manuals.<sup>27</sup> Although the Army intelligence officer in a tactical position may want to do those things preparatory to performance during combat, his lack of experience and credibility with the decisionmakers and others in the organization often hinders his actual accomplishment of intelligence tasks. He may also spend a large amount of his time executing or supervising additional duties primarily involving physical security.<sup>28</sup> Army intelligence officers may even conclude that the security function is as important as the intelligence function.<sup>29</sup> This is the wrong conclusion and reflects a shallow understanding of the role of intelligence in decisionmaking.

Decisionmaking during future conflicts will be more important than in past conflicts because numerical inferiority will force U.S. commanders to take risks and make extremely difficult choices regarding the employment of forces.<sup>30</sup> These decisions will require both perceptive long range intelligence and precise comprehensive intelligence during the actual crisis. The gravity of the consequences

of decisions expected to be made in the 1980's and 1990's demand that serious attention be devoted to the relationship of intelligence and decisions in tactical plans and operations.

The relationship between intelligence and policy or in a broader sense knowledge and action is studied closely in national decisionmaking.<sup>31</sup> It is probably apparent to the reader that several problems still plague the national decisionmaking process. Nonetheless, the process developed by specialists in national decisionmaking is similiar to the military decisionmaking process. Thus, the national decisionmaking process may offer some useful insights into the proper relationship between the tactical decisionmaker and the intelligence officer.

Both the decisionmaker and the intelligence officer have responsibilities that must be accomplished in order to achieve the proper relationship in the decisionmaking process. Failure by either the decisionmaker or the intelligence officer to discharge his responsibility will damage the actual decisionmaking process and may systematically result in bad decisions.

Specialists in decisionmaking agree that a policymaking process should accomplish several tasks. It must ensure that sufficient information about the situation under consideration is obtained and analyzed adequately so it provides an incisive and valid diagnosis of the problem. The policymaking process must facilitate consideration of all major interests affected by the policy issue at hand.

It must assure a search for a wide range of options and thorough evaluation of the expected consequences of each. The process must provide for careful consideration of the problems in implementing the options under consideration. Finally the process and members must remain receptive to indications that current policies are not working out well and learn from these.<sup>32</sup>

In order to fulfill his essential functions in the decisionmaking process, the intelligence officer must perform four separate tasks. The intelligence officer must first provide guidance for the collection process, so that information is collected on the subjects he must provide the decisionmaker. Secondly, he must remain aware of the concerns of the decisionmaker so that intelligence is produced which is relevant to the forthcoming decision. Thirdly, he must produce high quality, objective, relevant, and timely intelligence reports and products. Fourth, he must convey his reports and estimates in a persuasive manner, which is essential to produce the results the intelligence warrants.<sup>33</sup>

There are several related tasks the decisionmaker must perform if the relationship is to be successful. The decisionmaker must provide guidance to the intelligence officer on the type of intelligence he needs. He must keep the intelligence officer informed of policies under consideration and operations of the organization. Finally, the decisionmaker must evaluate the intelligence he receives



and provide feedback to the intelligence officer.<sup>34</sup>

Attitude plays a major part in the success or failure in establishing this relationship.<sup>35</sup> It is therefore essential that both the intelligence officer and the decision-maker, when assessing the quality of the ongoing decision-making procedures or any prospective changes, consider this intangible factor along with other more quantifiable factors.

In reviewing the above process and considerations, there is no discernible reason not to follow the same process in decisionmaking in tactical units. As in all things the procedures must be adapted to the time and resources available, but these constraints do not invalidate the process. In fact the converse may be true. By practicing this process and establishing the relationship between the intelligence officer and the decisionmaker during periods of noncombat, the decisionmaking process can be made more efficient, more responsive, and more resistant to the stress and confusion that accompany activities in combat.

The preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to perform his intelligence task in the 1980's and 1990's may depend in great part on how well this relationship is established during training. Effective decisionmaking not only requires pertinent and relevant information, but the decisionmaker must recognize that this information is essential to his decision. This recognition must be combined with respect for the intelligence process as well as respect for the intelligence officer.<sup>36</sup> The likelihood that the decision-maker will not believe the intelligence reports and estimates

presented to him increases, regardless of the veracity of the intelligence, when the decisionmaker does not respect the intelligence officer. When the relationship deteriorates to a point where there is little or no interplay between the intelligence producer and the decisionmaker, the decisionmaker discredits the intelligence he receives or seeks his own source of information for use in making decisions and developing plans or systems.<sup>37</sup>

The intelligence officer in both strategic and tactical positions must achieve two goals to enhance his preparedness to participate in decisionmaking in the 1980's and 1990's. These goals must remain primary and should not be overshadowed by ancillary tasks or selfish motives.

First, the Army intelligence officer must improve his performance and his participation in decisionmaking. This requires an in-depth knowledge of his intelligence tasks and his role in the decisionmaking process. He must gain and keep the respect of the decisionmaker and other members in the organization who influence the decisionmaking process. This may require the intelligence officer in a strategic position to gain more in-depth knowledge and understanding through study or travel. Strategy and area studies are good subjects to consider.

The intelligence officer in a tactical position may also be required to gain experience and practical knowledge of the U.S. Army's organizations, tactics, capabilities, and limitations. Undoubtedly, the purpose of this additional study and experience for the Army intelligence officer in both

strategic and tactical positions should be to improve his confidence and to build respect for him as an officer and as an intelligence professional.

Second, the Army intelligence officer must study the enemy. He must be knowledgeable of the capabilities, limitations, organizations and interests of probable adversaries and familiar with potential adversaries. He must remain current on contingency areas and potential areas of employment to include geographic, environmental, political, and other factors.<sup>38</sup> The number and diversity of situations and places where military power may be required in the future stretches across the entire spectrum of conflict; therefore, intelligence officers as well as others must not be detracted from preparing for their primary mission.<sup>39</sup> It must be remembered that even in this high technology and automated era, the individual must make the basic decisions upon which the entire intelligence process depends.<sup>40</sup>

#### Effects of Technology on Collection

Technology has increased the distance at which information about targets can be acquired and needs to be acquired; the quantity and quality of information that can be collected; the quantity and types of collection sensors that can be employed; the rate of interplay between collection systems; and, above all, the importance of the information collected. This trend is expected to continue in the future, probably

at an even faster pace than in the past. The maintenance of a technological lead in intelligence collection as well as other systems, is essential to the achievement of America's strategic and tactical objectives if "Technological Warfare" is to be successful.<sup>41</sup> Intelligence personnel along with the strategist play a major role in the creation of a "strategy of technology."<sup>42</sup>

Available techniques of collection include gathering open source information, such as news media; human intelligence; signals intelligence; and photographic, or imagery intelligence.<sup>43</sup> The quality of the information collected is determined by the limitations inherent in each collection technique and the method of employment used. For example, the quality of imagery obtained by high flying photographic surveillance systems is not only degraded by clouds, haze, smog, and mist, but also by the angle of the sun.<sup>44</sup> Collection shortcomings result in too little information or irrelevant information being collected. Equally important is too much information being collected for this can result in an all-source glut that obscures and defies analysis.<sup>45</sup>

Determining what information is to be collected is one of the weakest areas in the intelligence process and the problem of collecting too much information gets worse as technological capabilities increase.<sup>46</sup> Determining the information needs of each commander, which forms the basis for selecting the collection technique, is a complex task because of the sheer volume of enemy forces expected under many situations.<sup>47</sup>

As stated earlier, the commander's guidance to the intelligence officer of the type of intelligence he needs, the priorities in which he needs the intelligence, and the degree of certainty he desires it is essential to the intelligence officer's execution of his responsibilities in the decisionmaking process. The commander is the only person who can properly provide this guidance because he alone knows his intentions as he plans or executes an operation.<sup>48</sup> It should not be anticipated that on either the sophisticated or relatively unsophisticated battlefield of the 1980's that the commander will provide or needs to provide detailed guidance to the intelligence officer. At the same time, the potential scope and unprecedented intensity that war can have in the 1980's and 1990's make it necessary for the relatively limited intelligence collection systems to concentrate on the essential tasks that satisfy commander's operational needs.<sup>49</sup>

Achieving balance within the intelligence process and between the decisionmaker's information needs and intelligence systems capabilities may not be attainable. This divergence is created by the increasing information needs of decision-makers; the nature and size of the enemy forces expected under many situations; the limitations of the current intelligence collection systems; the amount of time available; and the relatively limited capability to analyze and communicate the data once it is collected. This gap is more evident at the tactical level than at the strategic, but is not necessarily more true.

At the tactical level discrepancies are measured in more quantifiable terms such as range, accuracy, and speed. From a comparison of the capability of weapon and target acquisition systems and decision requirements and intelligence systems capabilities a gap is uncovered. This gap between the commanders operational information needs and the actual capability of available intelligence systems to provide information and intelligence to satisfy those needs can be widened or closed in the future. The strategy, doctrine, and weapons evolving in the 1980's and 1990's have the potential to further widen the existing gap. Thus, the intelligence officer's receipt and implementation of the commander's intelligence collection guidance becomes critical in providing the essential information that actually satisfies operational needs.

Conversely, commander's guidance that is overly detailed or does not allow for a reasonable degree of uncertainty may restrict the intelligence officer's ability to select the best combination of intelligence collectors to fulfill the essential operational needs. It may also limit his flexibility to initiate collection efforts to fill important intelligence gaps. To arrive at the most effective and efficient degree of intelligence collection guidance as well as the optimum time and method of disseminating this guidance requires the commander and intelligence officer to practice the process. The effect of the attitudes of the participants on the collection process and the unique

leadership style of each commander can only be learned from experience, preferably acquired prior to actual combat.

Technology permits and demands that information about enemy forces and other targets be collected while they are at a greater distance from friendly front lines than ever before. The range and capability of Soviet offensive weapons have been extended to the point that the rear areas of Western forces have become immediate potential targets. It is therefore, essential that Western forces have the capability to locate and then to destroy the opponent in offensive capability.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, a joint Army and Air Force study of the information needs of commanders shows that enemy forces close to friendly front lines need continuous coverage to permit tracking and targeting their mobile weapons. Also the information must be accurate within meters, no later than five minutes old, must identify the specific target type, and must go directly to the user.<sup>51</sup>

The preceding constraints resulted in the development of the distinction between intelligence and "combat information." The way in which the term "combat information" is defined and used can influence the development of systems, organizations, and the future role of the military intelligence officer. FM 34-10 which is principally a manual for intelligence personnel defines combat information as "raw data which can be passed directly to combat and combat support units to be used for fire and maneuver, without interpretation,

analysis, or integration with other data."<sup>52</sup> JCS Publication 1 defines combat information as "unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user tactical intelligence requirements."<sup>53</sup>

The negative implications of concluding that combat information cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirement may have prompted the then Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army, Major General Thompson's comments on the issue. He said, "There is no piece of combat intelligence which, if accurate and timely enough, can't or shouldn't be shot at first and analyzed second. This is why I have a particular aversion to the concept of combat information as being something different from tactical intelligence. Combat information is simply the top priority task of any good tactical intelligence effort."<sup>54</sup>

Associated with the application of these two terms is the discussion about the concept of command, control, communications and intelligence, often referred to as C<sup>3</sup>I. In arguing against the integration of the command, control and communications functions with the intelligence function, Donald R. Cotter who was nuclear adviser to three secretaries of defense stated, "What the battlefield commander needs is operational information, not 'intelligence'. Intelligence people deal in intelligence; commanders deal in information."<sup>55</sup> This



may not be an accurate assessment of the situation but it demonstrates a perception that exists at both the strategic and tactical levels and the awesome challenge facing the intelligence officer.

The complexities of conflicting organizations, systems and roles must be overcome to meet the challenge of the 1980's and 1990's. Contributing to the satisfaction of the commander's combat information needs within the constraints of time will be the challenge for the Army intelligence officer.

Satisfying the commander's combat information and intelligence needs has resulted in several major changes in the last decade and more are projected for this and the next decade. Included within these changes is the integration of the collection of intelligence and the conduct of electronic warfare into integrated organizations organic to the Army corps and divisions.<sup>56</sup>

These integrated military intelligence organizations (designated as Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) enhance the commander's capability to collect multi-disciplined information using airborne and ground systems organic to the units and to receive information from national or strategic collection systems.<sup>57</sup> The formation of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command in 1977 provides intelligence collection to satisfy the commander's information needs, but they have been equipped with few new target acquisition means that extend their range capability.<sup>58</sup>

Even after the integrated military intelligence units are fully fielded at the division level, the accuracy and range of currently proposed organic collection systems will be unable to fulfill the current extended battle requirements. Each tactical level may be required to obtain information from the collection systems of higher organizations. Reliable communications are essential to carry out this transfer.<sup>59</sup>

The target acquisition range of collection systems is crucial to the early targeting of enemy force. It is estimated that 48% of the mobile high value, time sensitive targets that NATO forces need to destroy are more than 30 kilometers behind the forward line of contact and 80% of Warsaw Pact combat regiments would be dispersed more than 20 kilometers behind the forces in initial contact.<sup>60</sup> As the range of weapon systems increases beyond the range of target acquisition systems, the Army intelligence officer in conjunction with others must develop alternative ways to collect information that supports the extended range of existing and projected weapons.

Several systems that can collect the type of information commanders need to extend both targeting range and planning time are being developed or procured commercially. These systems range from initiatives by individual organizations, to systems being developed jointly by separate nations. The Army intelligence officer of the 1980's and 1990's will participate in the development of these systems at the tactical and strategic level. His preparedness to articulate

the information needs of commanders in transactions often involving other services, commercial companies, civilian agencies, and other nations is a significant determinant of the potential success or failure of the system's actual performance in support of strategic and tactical operations.

Knowledge of strategy, tactical considerations, and weapons characteristics along with intelligence collection, transmission, and security factors will significantly enhance the Army intelligence officer's ability to properly articulate the pertinent informational and employment characteristics the system must have. Information from strategic and tactical collection systems will be made more readily available to all in the 1980's and 1990's as evidenced by the use of a variant of the U-2 aircraft which is designated TR-1 because it is dedicated to satisfying the information needs of the tactical commander.<sup>61</sup>

The TR-1 Precision Location Strike System is a radar and emitter location device and is scheduled to become operational in 1984.<sup>62</sup> The TR-1, as a high altitude standoff surveillance system, complemented by a modified version of the RF-4C acting as an imaging penetrator extends the information collection range of the tactical commander. Using state of the art, high resolution, side-looking radar, the TR-1 can survey broad areas and transmit, via data link, time sensitive information to tactical commanders. High resolution infrared imagery information from the modified

RF-4C operating in enemy territory can be transmitted, via data link, to a ground station in friendly territory or relayed by the TR-1 to the tactical commander's ground station.<sup>63</sup>

The TR-1 surveillance system dramatically demonstrates the effect of technology on collection and its capability to produce huge quantities of data. One TR-1 emitter locator and targeting system can intercept battlefield emitters--HF, VHF, UHF, and radar in the 2 to 500 megahertz range, and in the 800 megahertz to 12 gigahertz range for air defense radars. It can operate in near real time (thus providing almost instantaneous targeting data); target up to 130 kilometers away; target with an accuracy of 50 to 150 meters; and intercept and process targets at a rate of 20 to 30 per minute for VHF and above, and two targets per minute in HF frequencies.<sup>64</sup> Operating alone the TR-1 is limited to detecting active enemy's electromagnetic signals and was not designed to locate individual tanks, rockets, and artillery tubes.<sup>65</sup>

Another joint Air Force/Army System under development is a new generation of long range, all weather, precise, and near real time radar target locating system. Formerly known as Pave Mover and later designated Joint Surveillance Target and Target Attack Radar System it can locate moving targets as small as a single tank at ranges greater than 150 kilometers.<sup>66</sup> It is expected to be deployed as a joint system by 1986.<sup>67</sup>

Technology which permits targets to be autonomously sought out without human aid is also expected to be fielded in the near future.<sup>68</sup> The primary group in this category is the Remotely Piloted Vehicles. The proposed funding for fiscal year 1983 contained a request for 83.7 million dollars for the development of the Remotely Piloted Vehicle. This target acquisition system will provide a capability to locate targets, adjust artillery fire, and designate targets for laser-guided weapons.<sup>69</sup>

Human intelligence collection may take on added importance in the 1980's and 1990's. Some of the technical problems encountered in collecting against denied areas can only be overcome by human intelligence collection. Also the Soviet Union may have a program for reducing the effectiveness of technical collection efforts. This "high level program known as 'Maskirovka' seeks both to deny information and also to manage its outflow so as to deceive U.S. collection efforts."<sup>70</sup> It is sufficient here to note that as imagery intelligence and signals intelligence grows, human intelligence becomes more and more important. The human source often provides the key link to unlock the puzzle or clarify the ambiguous.<sup>71</sup>

As more systems are developed that have the capability to both collect information and guide the force to destroy the target under observation fundamental questions are raised about which organization should control them and about the intelligence profession. The question raised

in Chapter II concerning the profession of intelligence and the participation of the military intelligence officer in the direction or control phase of "the management of violence" becomes even more unclear. Also the distinction between combat information and intelligence may affect the allocation of these systems to organizations and more importantly it may affect the way collected information is handled. This is particularly applicable when considering the implication of systems like the Remotely Piloted Vehicles, and the concept of command, control, and communications integrated with intelligence.

The combination of existing and emerging collection systems add to the complexity of the intelligence tasks. The fiscal, organizational, and interservice controversies that surround some of the collection systems further add to the complexity of developing, deploying, and managing them for strategic or tactical intelligence purposes.

The efficient and effective management of the collection systems of the future will require the Army intelligence officer to practice his profession with art and skill. He must first know and understand the information needs of the commander in each situation which requires him to be knowledgeable of strategy, military operations and the employment characteristics of various weapons systems. He must understand and be able to skillfully employ the collection systems of each intelligence discipline to satisfy the identified information needs. In order to do this, the intelligence officer must

be aware of the strengths and limitations of the intelligence systems operating at both the strategic and tactical level and how they complement each other. Throughout the decision and collection phase, the Army intelligence officer must consider the relationship of collection to analysis.

### Effects of Technology on Analysis

The speed with which incidents will develop in the 1980's and 1990's and the increasing number of nongovernment actors, such as religious groups, regional alliances, multinational corporations, labor and cultural groups will make intelligence analysis more critical yet more difficult. Information flow will become more rapid and cause the distinction between tactical and strategic intelligence to blur. These factors will make the intelligence analyst's performance critical, more demanding and broader.<sup>72</sup>

Generally two schools of thought exist about what U.S. national security policymakers expect from analytical intelligence. One school is that the analyst cannot predict major events for often the actors in the situation do not know themselves what they will do. The second school of thought is that not only should the analyst produce intelligence, but he should articulate and evaluate policies.<sup>73</sup> The military has tended to follow the tradition that intelligence should primarily tell the commander what the enemy physically can or cannot do.<sup>74</sup> The next two decades may see the analyst's role moving more toward an integrated approach, whereby the analyst must understand the entire process.<sup>75</sup>

The importance of valid analysis has historically been established. After each crisis and after most so-called "intelligence failures" it has been found that the information was available but had not been properly analyzed.<sup>76</sup> Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, former Director Defense Intelligence Agency, commented that ". . .the malfunction of analysis is potentially the most serious drawback which any nation's intelligence could experience."<sup>77</sup> The importance of analysis to national security has been the motive for several efforts to improve the analysis phase of intelligence. William E. Colby, former Director Central Intelligence suggested that better analysis can result from three approaches. They are the academic stressing scholarly research and debate; the "method" approach employing new information processing machinery to collate related facts, and to establish an audit trail for any conclusion; and stressing intuition based on the analyst's experience and the inclusion of the intangible factors.<sup>78</sup>

A rapprochement between intelligence and academe was offered in 1981 and has the potential to continue to grow. It is anticipated that both intelligence and the academic community can benefit from reestablishing the ties that existed before the 1960's. The academic community has the potential to increase the production of basic research on lower priority countries while enhancing the productivity of its liberal arts students.<sup>79</sup> Continuing this rapprochement



will be a task for the Army intelligence officer in the future. At the same time, this association can improve the Army intelligence officer's analytical capability by extending his data base and also sharpening his individual analytical skills. It has been suggested that the use of the historical research method would improve National Intelligence Estimates.<sup>80</sup> Using this method may also improve other intelligence analysis to include estimates for tactical plans.

Technology increased the volume and type of information collected to the point where the analyst's ability to select the right information has become critical. Analysts now have large data bases, but they do not have information operations aids that assist in the intellectual process of analysis. Adhering to the "method" approach, information operations aids must assist in trend analysis, inference, correlation, deduction, abstraction, and provide a variety of display technologies through which the analyst can communicate, present, and explain his conclusions and observations. Computers and communications aspects of technology are capable of doing this, but data base science and engineering, software engineering, standards and various interface devices are not capable of satisfying all requirements. The decade of the 1980's and 1990's will see the use of technology to support the needs of intelligence analysts and decisionmakers.<sup>81</sup> The Army intelligence officer will be expected to manage the development and employment of these systems.

Information storage and retrieval architecture during the next two decades will be changed to reflect multi-purpose data to handle multi-disciplined intelligence. The current practice of each discipline having a separate data base will probably be replaced by data base with functionally oriented data sets. This common data base may cut across not only disciplines within intelligence, but functional areas such as operations as well.<sup>82</sup> Thus the Army intelligence officer qualified in multi-disciplined tasks should derive greater benefit from this type system than an officer who is not.

By the 1990's a redundant, internettted system to provide survivability of information base and flow, and the ability to regenerate the data base of each node, which requires certain intelligence information systems to be functionally interchangeable, will be required. This necessitates a more standard, modular and understandable system.<sup>83</sup> Again it appears that the Army intelligence officer will need to be prepared to execute multi-disciplined intelligence tasks at both the strategic and tactical level in order to derive the most benefits from a standard system.

Technically it is possible to develop a system by the 1990's that satisfies the analyst's requirements, but it will need joint efforts in conceptualization, design and implementation.<sup>84</sup> This will be another challenge for the Army intelligence officer. The Active Information System is under development by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is designed to be both an analytical support system and an

information processing system in support of analytical activities. The system's goal is to simulate an analyst colleague by serving as an information resource, consultant, and adviser to a fellow analyst.<sup>85</sup>

Technology that will come into play in the next ten or twenty years includes continued growth in computational ability. It is even projected that construction of a physically small computer with the reasoning power of a human is near.<sup>86</sup>

Technology provides information processing aids that support all tactical units and aids for analytical activities are scattered within the tactical units, as well. In order to prepare the analyst for the loss of certain intelligence sources during combat, the tactical intelligence analyst's training should encourage him to develop a proficiency in dealing with combat uncertainties.<sup>87</sup>

Stressing the approach based on intuition, Major General Dallas C. Brown, Jr. recommended that officers desiring assignments in strategic analysis should gain practical experience at the tactical level, and obtain training in a related field of social science, such as history, area studies, or international relations. Language training helps and the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program is the best preparation.<sup>88</sup>

Technology has resulted in the intelligence system becoming both a threat and a savior. "It is a threat in an age of information explosion, when policymakers must depend

heavily upon the system to collect, analyze, interpret, and communicate information, often at great speed." Thus it possesses the power potential to control the information assumptions of a decision. It is a possible savior because correct decisions for the future need adequate information.<sup>89</sup>

Technology paces strategy and forces the new development of new military strategies, such as the AirLand Battle Doctrine. Conversely strategy and military doctrine can and should pace technology.<sup>90</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 4 and 5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>4</sup>Deborah M. Kyle and Deborah G. Meyer, "Has NATO  
<sup>3</sup>I Gone Haywire?," Armed Forces Journal International  
120(December 1982), 56.

<sup>5</sup>Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., American National Security Policy and Process (1981), 332.

<sup>6</sup>Stephen T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (1970), 325.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report. Fiscal Year 1983 (1982), 1-12.

<sup>8</sup>Jordan, Policy and Process, 19.

<sup>9</sup>Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949), ix.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 151.

<sup>11</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100 Coordinating Draft, Military Leadership (1983), 10-5.

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Army, Programmed Text 25-2, Introduction to Analytical Decisionmaking (1982), 1-2.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 1-3.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1982), 2-7.

<sup>15</sup>Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (1976), 117.

<sup>16</sup>FM 22-100 (1983), 7-1.

<sup>17</sup>Jay Galbraith, Designing Complex Organizations (1973), 5.

<sup>18</sup>Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (1980), 17.

<sup>19</sup>Henry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (1970), 9.

<sup>20</sup>U.S. Congress, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (hereafter cited as the Murphy Commission), vol 7, "Evolution of Papers on 'Intelligence Function' and Intelligence and Policymaking" by Harry H. Ransom, June 1975, 50.

<sup>21</sup>Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, 9.

<sup>22</sup>Possony, Strategy of Technology, 1.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 78.

<sup>24</sup>Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anana and Warren Milberg, eds, Intelligence Policy and National Security (1981), 246.

<sup>25</sup>Murphy Commission, vol 7 "Intelligence and Policy Making in an Institutional Context" by William J. Barnds, June 1975, 21.

<sup>26</sup>Herbert J. Shukiar, "Tactical Intelligence Analysis: Challenges for the 80s," Signal 36(October 1981), 38.

<sup>27</sup>Russell Grimm, "The 35A Dilemma: Tactical Proficiency," Military Intelligence 7(July-September 1981), 16.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>James H. Correll, II., "Garrison Functions of a Brigade S2 in Europe," Military Intelligence 6(April-June 1980), 15.

<sup>30</sup>Charles A. Gabriel, "Tactical Reconnaissance for the 1980s," Signal 34(October 1979), 9.

<sup>31</sup>Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, 3.

<sup>32</sup>Goerge, Presidential Decisionmaking, 10.

<sup>33</sup>Murphy Commission, vol 7 "Intelligence and Policy Making" by Barnds, 30.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>36</sup>Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, 210.

<sup>37</sup>Richard H. Giza, "The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates (1980), 198.

<sup>38</sup>Correll, "Brigade S2 in Europe," 15.

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-1, The Army (1981), 4.

<sup>40</sup>Robert F. Collins, "Military Intelligence," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 8.

<sup>41</sup>Possony, Strategy of Technology, 4. This work defines Technological warfare as "the direct and purposeful application of the national technological base and of specific advances generated by the base to attain strategic and tactical objectives."

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 61.

<sup>43</sup>Jordan, Policy and Process, 130 and 132.

<sup>44</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Pave Mover-J/STARS," Armed Forces Journal International (January 1983), 38.

<sup>45</sup>Jordan, Policy and Process, 148.

<sup>46</sup>Murphy Commission, vol 7 "Intelligence and Policy Making" by Barnds, 33.

<sup>47</sup>Gabriel, "Tactical Reconnaissance," 9.

<sup>48</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence)(Division) (1981), 1-5.

<sup>49</sup>FM 100-5 (1982), 1-1.

<sup>50</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "NATO's New Strategy: Defend Forward, But STRIKE DEEP," Armed Forces Journal International 120(November 1982), 50.

<sup>51</sup>Gabriel, "Tactical Reconnaissance," 9.

<sup>52</sup>FM 34-10 (1981), 1-4.

<sup>53</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1979).

<sup>54</sup>Edmund R. Thompson, "The Challenge of MI Leadership in the 80's," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 50.

<sup>55</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "No NATO C<sup>3</sup>I 'Check-out Counter'," Armed Forces Journal International 120(December 1982), 66.

<sup>56</sup>D. Wilson, "Tactical Intelligence Tomorrow" Military Intelligence 4(Summer 1976), 13.

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<sup>60</sup>Schemmer, "NATO's STRIKE DEEP," 68.

<sup>61</sup>Gabriel, "Tactical Reconnaissance," 10.

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<sup>64</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Will NATO's C<sup>3</sup>/EW/I Systems Let Its 'Strike Deep' Strategy Work?" Armed Forces Journal International 120(December 1982), 93.

<sup>65</sup>\_\_\_\_\_ "Pave Mover-J/STARS," 38.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 39.

<sup>67</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Defense Resources Board, Congress Order Early IOC for 'Assault Breaker'," Armed Forces Journal International 120(September 1982), 112.



<sup>68</sup>Judith Anspacher, "Verne L. Lynn, Deputy Director for Technology, DARPA," Military Electronics/Countermeasures 8(June 1982), 12.

<sup>69</sup>DOD Report FY 83, III-12.

<sup>70</sup>Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection (1982), 5.

<sup>71</sup>Richard H. Giza, Discussant concerning paper "Covert Action" by Hugh Tovar in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence, ed. Roy Godson (1979), 71.

<sup>72</sup>David T. Twining, "Strategic Intelligence in the 1980s: Reflections on a Dynamic World," Military Intelligence 6(April-June 1980), 9.

<sup>73</sup>Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates (1980), 1 and 2.

<sup>74</sup>Angelo Codevilla, "Comparative Historical Experience of Doctrine and Organization" in Analysis and Estimates, 29.

<sup>75</sup>William E. Colby, "Recruitment, Training and Incentives for Better Analysis" in Analysis and Estimates, 167.

<sup>76</sup>Richard H. Giza, "The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer" in Analysis and Estimates, 194.

<sup>77</sup>Daniel O. Graham, "Analysis and Estimates" in Elements of Intelligence, 24.

<sup>78</sup>Colby, "Better Analysis," 164.

<sup>79</sup>Richard W. Bates, Intelligence and Academe: Estranged Communities," The American Intelligence Journal 4(Summer 1981), 12.

<sup>80</sup>Richard E. Pipes, "Better Analysis," 173.

<sup>81</sup>John Lytle, "Evolution of Intelligence Information Processing," Signal 36(October 1981), 18.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Christine A. Montgomery, "An Active Information System for Intelligence Analysis," Signal 36(October 1981), 20.

<sup>86</sup>Anspacher, "Verne Lynn," 12.

<sup>87</sup>Shukiar, "Tactical Intelligence Analysis," 38.

<sup>88</sup>Dallas C. Brown, Jr., "Strategic Intelligence The Army Role," Military Intelligence 6(April-June 1980), 8.

<sup>89</sup>Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, 253 and 254.

<sup>90</sup>Possony, Strategy of Technology, 11.

## CHAPTER IV

### AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

New doctrine requires the Army intelligence officer to change his intelligence activities. Some changes simply continue the evolutionary growth of the profession while other changes, particularly the organizational changes toward integrated intelligence and electronic warfare organizations discussed in Chapter III are an outgrowth of the lessons learned during the Vietnam War.

The forces of technology create still further changes. In fact, technology plays a major role in the development and implementation of strategy and military doctrine.<sup>1</sup> Evidence of this can be seen in the developing change in NATO's strategy. This strategy would rely on conventional weapons and long range targeting sensors to locate and strike high value air bases, command posts, and second echelon formations while they are still deep in Warsaw Pact territory.<sup>2</sup> This strategy has immense appeal in NATO countries, particularly West Germany, because it has the potential of raising the nuclear threshold while moving the battlefield to Warsaw Pact territory.<sup>3</sup> Among the key issues to be resolved in implementing this strategy is the serious doubt about whether the NATO surveillance and reconnaissance systems can locate both close in targets and second and third echelon

Warsaw Pact forces at the same time.<sup>4</sup> It is anticipated that technology can be developed to overcome the technical problems associated with implementing this strategy quicker than the required controversial organizational issues can be resolved.<sup>5</sup>

The net result of the new doctrine and the rapid advances in technology is a major increase in emphasis on the accomplishment of the intelligence task. This increase in emphasis is directly related to achieving the objectives put forth in the new AirLand Battle Doctrine contained in FM 100-5.

The AirLand Battle Doctrine is based on the realization "that the United States must prepare itself for the use of military power across the entire spectrum of conflict, from relatively mild policy disagreements, to fairly intense non-war confrontations of an economic or political nature, to a range of military situations which could conceivably include nuclear war."<sup>6</sup> The implications of this type of global commitment apply at both the strategic level and the tactical level. Both require the most effective and efficient organization and personnel for intelligence collection, analysis, and communications.<sup>7</sup> It requires the commander to be prepared at all times. "There is no time to crank up the commander's intelligence apparatus after the start of hostilities."<sup>8</sup> The time between "peace" and the start of hostilities may range from a few hours for forward deployed forces to only days or weeks for other components.<sup>9</sup> Therefore,

it is wise for one to understand beforehand what is expected of him when the hostilities start. The AirLand Battle Doctrine provides operational guidance for both training and operations, and it is the foundation for the curriculum of the Army service school system.<sup>10</sup> Thus it guides training, system development, and actual operations. In short, the achievement of the objectives of the AirLand Battle becomes the best indicator of preparedness to perform assigned tasks in future battles.

The Army is challenged to be prepared to fight on a sophisticated or unsophisticated battlefield, against light, well equipped forces such as Soviet supported insurgents or sophisticated terrorist groups, highly mechanized Warsaw Pact forces or Soviet surrogates in southwest or northeast Asia.<sup>11</sup> Each of these possibilities requires different specific skills. For example countering terrorist activities requires human intelligence which in itself is a complex activity.<sup>12</sup> The Army intelligence officer will be challenged in the next two decades to retain a balance between human intelligence collection and technical collection.

Proponents of human intelligence collection project that the contribution of this form of collection will deepen during the coming decade. As understanding foreign intentions and a foreign entity's perception of his own capabilities becomes more important, the need for human intelligence collection increases.<sup>13</sup> Another argument for human intelligence

collection is the increasing probability of involvement at the lower level of the spectrum of conflict. Human intelligence collection may have more value than technical collection for conflict on the low end of the violence spectrum. Conversely, human intelligence collection may be capable of supplementing technical collection for scenarios where general war may be involved. It has been suggested that possible areas for the use of human intelligence collection are to learn the plans and capabilities of Soviet special operations teams that are probably targeted against NATO airfields and ports; to ascertain Soviet internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities; and to collect other information that only a human source can obtain, particularly biographic information.<sup>14</sup>

A less intriguing but very profitable employment of human intelligence collection is obtaining information from "frontline" troops, patrols, reconnaissance units, prisoners, refugees, displaced personnel, local personnel, captured enemy documents and other sources and agencies. It is generally accepted that basic research of unclassified material is required at the strategic level. However, it is equally important at the tactical levels. The study of geographic, historic, particularly military history, and current events type information can significantly enhance planning for employment in assigned regions and contingency areas. The Army intelligence officer must gain knowledge in this area and insure that members of his organization have access to

information pertinent to their duties. History shows and the current AirLand Doctrine requires the Army intelligence officer to think broadly when anticipating areas for the possible employment of military power. Areas like the Shaba Province and the Falkland Islands will continue to flare up in the next decade, particularly in view of the turbulence expected in areas such as the Third World countries.

The new AirLand Battle Doctrine concentrates on Soviet and Soviet style opponents. This simplifies the intelligence officer's overall tasks by permitting him to focus his attention primarily on this type of potential opponent, and to encourage his organization to do likewise.

The greater scope and intensity of future conflict, possibly involving nuclear and chemical weapons add greatly to the stress in decisionmaking.<sup>15</sup> As discussed in Chapter III the demands for intelligence normally increase as the risks go up. The AirLand Battle Doctrine's more offensive oriented objectives to "retain the initiative and disrupt our opponent's fighting capability in depth with deep attack, effective firepower and decisive maneuver" also depends in large part upon effective intelligence.<sup>16</sup> "Superior combat power applied at the decisive place and time decides the battle."<sup>17</sup> Intelligence contribution to the achievement of combat power has taken on added importance as exemplified by the emphasis on having readily available knowledge of the enemy and terrain thru the use of reconnaissance and other intelligence activities. Effective firepower also requires

efficient target acquisition systems.<sup>18</sup> The significance here is that the extended nature of the battlefield makes precise intelligence collection a central issue rather than just a factor which can achieve additional benefit.

As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, decisionmaking must become more decentralized.<sup>19</sup> Thus the intelligence officer at all levels must be prepared to execute independently his responsibility in the decisionmaking process. During training, he must establish an effective decisionmaking relationship and develop interpersonal associations based on mutual respect and confidence as a precursor to independent operations.

A historical example where this type relationship was established occurred in July 1943 during the invasion of Sicily. General George S. Patton asked his intelligence officer, "if I attack Agrigento, will I bring on a major engagement?" His intelligence officer, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, immediately replied, "No Sir," and Patton directed his operations officer to issue the order. Not only did Patton know that his intelligence officer's immediate response was based on accumulated intelligence information, but Koch also knew that command guidance precluded Patton from engaging in a major engagement.<sup>20</sup> This example does not suggest that the intelligence officer succumbed and told the commander what he wanted to hear, but that he knew in advance what intelligence information Patton would need to execute his plans. He had learned this from working closely with Patton



in previous operations.<sup>21</sup> Agrigento was taken on the night of July 16-17, 1943 and no major engagement ensued.<sup>22</sup>

Decentralization also requires that the Army intelligence officer train the personnel under his supervision and develop an efficient collection, analysis, and communications system at his level. Each intelligence officer is responsible for the intelligence system at his level and interpreting the effects of intelligence estimates prepared by others on his command's mission.

As a prelude to the Battle of the Bulge, General Eisenhower's intelligence staff at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces failed to predict the massive German counteroffensive in the Ardennes on December 16, 1944.<sup>23</sup> However, the Third Army G-2, at his level, estimated a German counteroffensive, and so warned Patton.<sup>24</sup> It is anticipated that future battlefields will be typified by considerable movement over large areas and independent operations.<sup>25</sup> Thus decisionmaking will often occur independently because the commander and staff may be isolated from other units.

On the other hand, intelligence collection during normal operations will be shared between different levels of headquarters. The intelligence officer must balance the need to be prepared to act independently when isolated electronically or physically, and the need to maintain continuous contact with other headquarters to satisfy extended battle information needs during other times.

The commander's consideration of the battlefield in terms of the time and space necessary to defeat an enemy force or to complete an operation before the enemy can reinforce has led to the need for the intelligence officer to expand the area in which he must monitor enemy forces.<sup>26</sup> This necessitates a greater exchange of information between headquarters and more reliance on an all-source information system to produce intelligence from information from various sources and disciplines.<sup>27</sup> This trend will continue in the future.

Thus the Army intelligence officer associated with all-source intelligence duties should be gaining experience in multi-disciplined intelligence tasks that can assist him in both strategic or tactical intelligence positions. The all-source intelligence centers link all levels of command intelligence information channels together. The process is logical, and the technical equipment to support the process is being developed or rapidly procured as discussed in Chapter III. The task now is to train intelligence officers to make immediate distribution.<sup>28</sup> Assignments in both tactical and strategic intelligence positions can assist the Army intelligence officer in understanding the informational needs and systems of each level, and can influence his attitude toward both levels. These assignments can also enhance his preparedness to perform multi-disciplined tasks at either level.

The AirLand Battle Doctrine certainly requires the Army intelligence officer to change his intelligence activities.

As accepted doctrine, it provides goals and a framework for the development of solutions to substantive problems that can influence the outcome of future battles.

#### How Prepared is He?

Possible indicators of the Army intelligence officer's preparedness to perform multi-disciplined tactical and strategic intelligence tasks in the future are assessments by tactical and strategic decisionmakers of their current performance. The limited nature of this study precludes the development of definitive conclusions about such an elusive subject but a few comments from these two groups may illuminate some of the issues in this study.

The remarks of two infantry brigade commanders in the 82d Airborne Division when interviewed in 1982 about their evaluation of the performance of Army intelligence officers they had worked with are revealing. They are not necessarily representative, but the commanders individually reflect years of military experience and observations.

Colonel Peter J. Boylan, a brigade commander, responded, "I think that the quality of the MI officer is very good. . . .he is an individual who has been well trained in his profession, that certain part of our profession--the MI Branch. . . .he has been able to because of the high intellectual capabilities that the majority of them have. . . to retain the preponderance of the information. . . and able to apply it. To the contrary of what I just said, I do tend to notice in my view a significant shortcoming both in

the capability of the MI officer to process tactical information and; perhaps, of even more concern is the desire of the predominant number of MI officers to move into strategic intelligence at the cost of their own training in tactical intelligence."29

Reflecting on his prior experience as a battalion commander, division G3, and action officer at the Joint Chief of Staff level, Colonel Boylan emphasized the importance of military intelligence officers at battalion and brigade level "understanding of what it is that is important to the infantry or combat arms commander. The best MI officers were those that felt very very much at home in that environment and had an excellent grasp of what it was that was important to the infantryman, of what it was that could get him killed, of what it was that was of interest to the company commander and was able to obtain that information. . . ." Furthermore, the best MI officers when ". . . given sufficient information were able to produce intelligence that was applicable at the appropriate level."30

Colonel James H. Johnson, a brigade commander, referred to the importance of having intelligence officers in intelligence positions. In reflecting on his experience in Vietnam, he stated, "I will never go into combat again without an MI officer performing those duties. . . the quality of guys we have today is as good or better than it ever was."31

The young Army intelligence officer's evaluation of himself is often not as high as the comments of the above commanders. Captain Russell Grimm's description of the young Army intelligence officer assigned to a tactical unit indicated that the officer had insufficient experience or credibility to handle the responsibilities of his job.<sup>32</sup>

Colonel Charles E. Thomann, USA (Retired) stated that, "Vietnam did a great deal to prove the worth of the tactical intelligence officer. This was the first conflict in our history where a large number of professional military intelligence personnel operated exclusively as tactical intelligence specialists, and they were highly successful."<sup>33</sup>

Brigadier General Sidney T. Weinstein, Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School had this to say, "My years in MI have convinced me that we, as a branch, have the brightest, most innovative men and women in the Army."<sup>34</sup>

#### Generalist or Specialist

Throughout the discussions in this thesis the issue of being a generalist or specialist has been included. It has evolved around whether the Army intelligence officer should develop as either a tactical or a strategic intelligence officer or as an officer who is prepared to work at both levels. This short section contains a brief discussion of views that affect the direction of the Army intelligence officer's development.

The U.S. Army in the future will need officers who are specialist, generalist and "functional generalist."<sup>35</sup> That was the conclusion of the Study Group for the Review of Education and Training for Officers which defined being a generalist, specialist, or functional generalist as follows:

A generalist is an officer whose primary efforts are involved in the management of more than one specialty field. A functional generalist is an officer whose primary efforts are aimed at managing several related specialties.<sup>36</sup>

A specialist is an officer whose training, education, and utilization are geared to the need for applying a narrowly definable body of subject matter expertise in the performance of his duties.<sup>37</sup>

The Army intelligence officer's primary efforts are not directed at managing more than one specialty field, so he is not a generalist. One school of thought suggests that the intelligence officer needs to be a specialist who is willing to remain in intelligence positions for 30 years because resources are scarce and technology is becoming more complex.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, it is suggested that second specialty officers from the combat arms are needed to serve in military intelligence positions while military intelligence officers are needed to serve in non intelligence secondary specialties to have military intelligence needs recognized by the Army.<sup>39</sup>

The Army intelligence officer is not a generalist but the diverse nature of the tasks associated with him supporting the decisionmaker's information needs require that he understand more than just one narrow subject matter.

Adhering strictly to the definitions associated with the terms above, one can conclude that the Army intelligence officer must become a functional generalist. This will enable him to effectively support the decisionmaker at either the strategic or tactical level. But how can this objective be achieved?

Several recommendations have been offered to develop the intelligence officer. Some are oriented to developing a specialist while others provide guidance on how to become a functional generalist. One school of thought asserts that it is not realistic to expect any officer to master numerous different tasks that require varying complex skills, technical expertise, and actual job experience.<sup>40</sup> The other view on this subject can be seen in the concept expressed by the current Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Major General William E. Odom. General Odom recommends a two phase approach to developing the career of the military intelligence officer.

During the first phase, the company grade military intelligence officer would gain experience at the tactical level. At this level he would learn tactical doctrine, military history, and the application of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. He would study how foreign armies apply combat power. Then he would improve his general education by studying a social science subject. Now, some of the officers need to study the physical sciences to deal with technical and scientific issues. During the second phase the officer

would develop a secondary skill in great depth. This skill could be in human intelligence, signals intelligence, counterintelligence, foreign area expertise, operations research, automatic data processing or other specialties. By his 15th or 16th year the officer would complete both phases and have a broad understanding of military operations.<sup>41</sup>

Alone, the above comments are not a basis for definitive conclusions. However, they illuminate some of the key issues in this thesis and indicate solutions to the problems of the future. The issues of profession, decisionmaking, information needs, and the strategic or tactical orientation of the Army intelligence officer were among the points they voiced. The determiner of the destiny of the Army intelligence officer is also summed up in Brigadier General Weinstein's comment that "We ourselves are the key to the future."<sup>42</sup>



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Stephen T. Possony and J. D. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (1970), 11.

<sup>2</sup>Benjamin F. Schemmer, "No NATO C<sup>3</sup>I 'Check-out Counter,'" Armed Forces Journal International 120(December 1982), 50.

<sup>3</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "NATO's New Strategy: Defend Forward, But STRIKE DEEP," Armed Forces Journal International 120(November 1982), 62.

<sup>4</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Will NATO's C<sup>3</sup>I/EW/I Systems Let its 'Strike Deep Strategy Work?' Armed Forces Journal International 120(December 1982), 69.

<sup>5</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "NATO's C<sup>3</sup>/EW/I," 69.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-1, The Army (1981), 4.

<sup>7</sup>Henry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (1970), 209.

<sup>8</sup>Daniel O. Graham, U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads (1976), 10.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1982), 1-3.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., i.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>12</sup>Michael Handel, "Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980's" in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates, ed. Roy Godson (1979), 106.

<sup>13</sup>Eugene F. Burgstaller, "Human Collection in the 1980's" in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collections, ed. Roy Godson (1982), 73.

<sup>14</sup>Frank Barrett, "Preface" in Clandestine Collections, vii and viii.

- <sup>15</sup>FM 100-5 (1982), 1-1.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., 2-4.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., 2-7.
- <sup>20</sup>Oscar W. Koch with Robert G. Hays, G2: Intelligence for Patton (1971), 2.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., 56.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid., 2.
- <sup>23</sup>Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies (1981), 140 and 143.
- <sup>24</sup>Koch, G2, 85 and 86.
- <sup>25</sup>FM 100-5 (1982), 1-2 and 1-3.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., 6-1.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., 6-2.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., 6-5.
- <sup>29</sup>Interview with Peter J. Boylan, Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 18 June 1982.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup>Interview with James H. Johnson, Commander, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 21 June 1982.
- <sup>32</sup>Russell Grimm, "The 35A Dilemma: Tactical Proficiency," Military Intelligence 7(July-September 1981), 16.
- <sup>33</sup>Charles E. Thomann, "Tactical Intelligence," The American Intelligence Journal 3(Spring 1981), 15.

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
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<sup>34</sup>Sidney T. Weinstein, "From the Commander," Military Intelligence 8(October-December 1982), 34.

<sup>35</sup>U.S. Army, A Review of Education and Training for Officers (5 vols., 1978), 1, p-x-3.

<sup>36</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, RETO Study, 4, R-4-u.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., R-4-4.

<sup>38</sup>Robert F. Collins, "Military Intelligence," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 9.

<sup>39</sup>Edmund R. Thompson, "The Challenge of MI Leadership in the 80's," Military Intelligence 5(October-December 1979), 50.

<sup>40</sup>Collins, "Military Intelligence," 8.

<sup>41</sup>Katherine L. Dooley, "ACSI Viewpoint," Military Intelligence 9(January-March 1983), 3.

<sup>42</sup>Weinstein, "From the Commander," 34.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The fundamental mission of the United States Army is to deter war, and should war occur, to win.<sup>1</sup> The preparedness of the Army intelligence officer to contribute effectively to the accomplishment of this mission depends on several variables. The quantity, quality, and pertinence of the officer's education and training will directly influence his preparedness to perform his essential intelligence tasks in the 1980's and 1990's. Also, his preparedness will be influenced by the capabilities and availability of intelligence organizations and information collectors to support the execution of his task. Moreover, the appropriateness of the tasks assigned him to cope with the realities that evolve can affect his preparedness.

#### Summary

The central objective of this thesis has been to examine the Army intelligence officer's preparedness to perform his task in the 1980's and 1990's. This effort has illuminated the fact that there are several interrelated prerequisites that will determine how well the officer actually performs in the next two decades.

The key element seems to be the effectiveness of the officer in contributing to the decisionmaking process at both the strategic and tactical level. In order to effectively contribute to decisionmaking, the Army intelligence officer and others involved in the decisionmaking process must understand what is expected of the intelligence officer. Second, the Army intelligence officer must be motivated to support the commander or decisionmaker and the decisionmaking process. Third, the Army intelligence officer must participate equally in the decisionmaking process with other staff participants, to include the operations officer. Fourth, the Army intelligence officer must be capable of doing his part.

Views about the breadth of expertise that the Army intelligence officer should have ranged from being a narrow specialist to a functional generalist. As was suggested in 1978 by the Army Study Group for the Review of Education and Training for Officers, the growth of technology and the proliferation of information require that an officer specialize to some degree in order to be competent.<sup>2</sup> However, the Army intelligence officer must also be a functional generalist in order to effectively cope with the rapidly expanding information needs of commanders and decisionmakers. He must get the right information from the huge quantity of targetable enemy forces which are expected in many instances. This requires knowledge of the rapidly advancing and sophisticated intelligence systems. The need to be a functional generalist

is further supported by the constraints imposed on the decisionmaking process in the future by time and the unprecedented destructive power of weapons. The speed with which events can develop and decisions can be communicated require that one officer be trained in both tactical and strategic multi-disciplined intelligence. The commander or decisionmaker normally will not have the opportunity to seek information from several specialists.

### Conclusions

The tactical/strategic intelligence officer, referred to as the Army intelligence officer in this thesis must continue to develop multi-disciplined intelligence skills in order to provide the commander or decisionmaker timely, comprehensive information.<sup>3</sup> Knowledge of the procedures and needs of both the tactical and strategic levels will also enhance the ability of the Army intelligence officer to use effectively the intelligence information and intelligence that is today and will be in the future transferred between these levels. The current trend of using information from "strategic" systems and sources at the tactical level is expanded by the AirLand Battle Doctrine and technology. This trend is expected to increase drastically in the next two decades.

Officer specialists will continue to be needed in military intelligence. However, the merits of providing the commander or decisionmaker an integrated estimate or



response from all the sources of information available will far outweigh the advantages of obtaining more indepth information from less sources.

The clarification of the military intelligence officer's relationship to the intelligence profession and the military officer profession will enhance the preparedness of the Army intelligence officer. The development of a consensus that the Army intelligence officer is a member of a profession will permit the profession to develop clear standards that state what is expected of the Army intelligence officer in the future. These standards can guide the officer's development of individual goals. Equally important they can provide guidelines to aid other members of the decisionmaking process in understanding what is expected of the Army intelligence officer. The profession can motivate the Army intelligence officer. It can provide a mechanism to adjust the standards to insure that the officer's development prepares him to perform multi-disciplined tactical and strategic intelligence tasks in the next two decades.

A strong profession can strengthen the officer's role in the decisionmaking process and assist in developing a solution to the challenging organizational and role issues that the dynamics of the 1980's and 1990's will continue to create. Lastly, the profession can control entry to the profession and certify members as capable of performing their professional tasks.

The historical inclination of the intelligence community toward federation will make it extremely difficult to implement a centralized education system. The statutory restrictions further limit centralization of the schools or their control. However, the centralization of Army conducted intelligence training is feasible.

Technology will lead to changes in the role of the Army intelligence officer and possibly intelligence. These changes can be positive or negative. Their direction will be heavily determined by the action of intelligence officers.

The current gap between commanders' and decision-makers' information needs and intelligence collection capabilities can widen in the next two decades. Thus collection guidance, the exchange of information between tactical and strategic levels, and the use of human intelligence will become more important.

Intelligence analysis can be improved by establishing a better balance between collection and analysis. Computerized analytical aids, sharing common data bases, and using the historical method will improve analysis. Analysis may be further improved by closer contacts with the academic community.

The adoption of a more offensive military strategy and the AirLand Battle Doctrine makes intelligence more important. It will also require that information be collected faster, at greater range, and communicated quicker than ever before. The emphasis on preparation for conflict at different levels

of intensity and in various regions requires the Army intelligence officer to broaden his interest. It also requires him to participate more often in decisionmaking situations during training, and to establish interpersonal relationships that enhance independent operation. In order to do this, he must learn to employ all the intelligence systems at his level to include human intelligence.

Overall, professional considerations, technology, and the AirLand Battle Doctrine forces the Army intelligence officer to be able to provide the decisionmaker or commander integrated intelligence. Therefore, the Army intelligence officer must prepare himself to perform multi-disciplined strategic and tactical intelligence tasks in the 1980's and 1990's.

#### Recommendations

It is recommended that further research be conducted concerning the relationship of the military intelligence officer to the intelligence profession and the profession of military officers. Being part of a profession can be a significant stabilizing influence in the turbulent 1980's and 1990's. It can also provide an environment to filter out the introduction of the negative aspects of technology and counter misinterpretations of the new AirLand Battle Doctrine. Officers, particularly young officers, need standards to relate to and to measure their progress by. Military intelligence officers are also challenged to lead

a scholarly dialogue with associates, other military leaders, and academicians to examine this relationship. It is anticipated that interest in the concept of profession will further benefit the professionalism of the U.S. Army

It is recommended that the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Officer (35) specialty be officially restructured to assign the specialty broad responsibilities encompassing the full range of military intelligence functions. Officers assigned this specialty should then be assigned multi-disciplined intelligence duties at both tactical and strategic levels. This restructured specialty could then be used to develop officers who are prepared to provide commanders and decisionmakers intelligence that is based on all the intelligence sources. The specialty could also be used to develop officers who are knowledgeable of signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human intelligence to lead the integrated intelligence organizations that will continue to be fielded in the future. It would also permit officers to select a second specialty to further broaden the officer or to gain specialization in a particular discipline. At the same time, other officers could specialize in one intelligence discipline.

Considering the infeasibility of establishing centralized multi-disciplined intelligence training at the Department of Defense level, it is recommended that the Specialty Proponency Office, United States Army Intelligence

Center and School<sup>4</sup> be assigned, on a priority basis, broader responsibilities in the development of the intelligence officer. It is specifically recommended that the Specialty Proponency Office implement the following policies. Within the limitations imposed by laws governing Officer Personnel Management, establish a professional development program to prepare the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Officer (35) to be a multi-disciplined tactical and strategic intelligence officer. Develop, distribute, and keep current as a supplement to DA Pamphlet 600-3 a comprehensive description of the education and assignments that a multi-disciplined intelligence officer should have.<sup>5</sup> Develop a program to measure the professional competence of officers assigned the 35 specialty. This measurement should be conducted in conjunction with schools that teach intelligence subjects such as the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Postgraduate Intelligence Program, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and Staff Schools, and the Senior Service Colleges.<sup>6</sup>

Broadening the responsibility of this office may require the assignment of additional military and civilian personnel. It is also recommended that the Specialty Proponency Office be directly subordinate to the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. The director of the Specialty Proponency Office should be granted sufficient authority to implement the above recommendations as well.

Army intelligence officers serving in one level must be encouraged to seek assignments at the other level to broaden their professional qualifications and enhance the transfer of vital information. The functions of the tactical and strategic intelligence officers are interrelated. The expertise each officer acquires at this level can benefit the decisionmaker and commander at the other level. Each officer's effectiveness in the decisionmaking process is largely determined by his individual qualities, attitude, motivation, and competence. However, the feeling that he contributes as an equal member of the team and that he can make a meaningful contribution to his organization is important to the establishment of an effective relationship. Therefore, it is recommended that the Army intelligence officer's position at each level be strengthened. This can occur by insuring that at each level the intelligence officer's rank is equal to the other members of the staff, and that he gains experience before being assigned as a principal staff officer. Senior intelligence officers also need to inform other decisionmakers of what the Army intelligence officer should be prepared to do.

Finally, it is recommended that commanders and decisionmakers practice communicating their operational information needs to the Army intelligence officer at each opportunity. Their essential information needs must be articulated in both written and verbal plans and orders. This will further prepare the Army intelligence

officer to perform his essential task in the future.

Brigadier General Weinstein stated, "Broad vision and a clear understanding of the role of Military Intelligence in the total Army, whether at battalion level or at the echelon above corps, is an absolute prerequisite to professional excellence. That kind of insight changes attitudes and modifies perceptions as to what the problems in our profession really are."<sup>7</sup> Knowledge, motivation, and understanding the essence of the above quote will prepare the Army intelligence officer to perform his task in the 1980's and 1990's. That task is to provide the decisionmaker the information required to deter war, and should war occur, to win.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-1, The Army (1981), 1.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, A Review of Education and Training for Officers (5 vols., 1978), 4, R-4-1.

<sup>3</sup>Albert E. Warburton III, "The Total Military Intelligence Officer: Intelligence Systems Managers," Military Review 60(April 1980), 27-41. This work recommends that all the intelligence disciplines be redesignated 35. Letter specialty skill identifiers would then be added to each specialty progressing up to 35F, Intelligence Systems Manager. The Intelligence Systems Manager would thus become the multi-disciplined intelligence officer. The author of this thesis recommends that the officer with specialty 35 be developed as the multi-disciplined intelligence officer.

<sup>4</sup>Kenneth D. Ballenger, "Specialty Proponency: Career Planning for All," Military Intelligence 7(1982), 56. This publication describes the military intelligence Specialty Proponency Office. Key points that relate to this thesis follow. On June 1, 1981 the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School established the Specialty Proponency Office within the Directorate of Training Developments using internal resources. Initially the office consisted of a lieutenant colonel as chief and three civilian action officers. As of 18 April 1983 the responsibilities of the office have been broadened and the personnel spaces increased to twelve military and three civilians. The chief of the Specialty Proponency Office reported directly to the Commander U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. Interview (telephonic) with Roy H. Parker, Intelligence Research Specialist, Specialty Proponency Office, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 18 April 1983 was made by the author of this thesis. The objectives of the specialty proponent system and the task of the proponent agencies are contained in Appendix B to this study. They are still in draft form but reflect current thinking on the program.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Army, RETO Study, 2, PE-6-I-1. This study also made this recommendation.

<sup>6</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, RETO Study, PX1-31. This study recommended that a means of validating qualification of officers assigned specialty 35 as an alternate specialty be developed.

<sup>7</sup>Sidney T. Weinstein, "From the Commander," Military Intelligence 8(October-December 1982), 34.



APPENDIX

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## CHAPTER 48

### TACTICAL/STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SPECIALTY (Specialty Code 35)

**48-1. Description of the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Specialty.** a. The Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Specialty encompasses application of the intelligence function in support of both tactical and strategic Army missions. This specialty supports the Army's mission through the planning, collection, production, and dissemination of tactical and strategic intelligence from all sources, and the conduct of aerial and ground surveillance and reconnaissance. A knowledge of foreign languages or foreign areas is desirable for this specialty.

b. Officers in the Tactical/Strategic Specialty serve in command, staff, and operational positions. Principal duties performed by officers participating in this specialty include:

(1) Directing or supervising employment of intelligence activities in acquisition and processing of intelligence.

(2) Directing or supervising intelligence activities which provide information on weather and terrain and enemy strength, disposition, organization, equipment, tactics, morale, and logistics vulnerability.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of intelligence estimates, reports and summaries, terrain analyses, and briefings.

(4) Preparation and formulation of intelligence plans, policies, and procedures as a member of a general or special staff.

(5) Planning and coordination of aerial and ground surveillance and reconnaissance support for the Army in the field.

(6) Directing imagery interpretation units in the acquisition of intelligence information.

**48-2. Role of the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Officer.** The role of the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Officer is to reduce the combat commander's uncertainty of the enemy and environment relative to the employment of combat power. At Department of

Defense (DOD) and Department of the Army (DA) levels, the officer provides national decisionmakers with a sound basis for the formulation of policy decisions involving the capabilities and limitations of our foremost potential adversaries. The Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Officer is concerned with directing and supervising employment of organic intelligence resources and planning for the optimum utilization of supporting nonorganic intelligence resources to best support accomplishment of the command's mission. Tactical/Strategic Intelligence officers should also be familiar with the functional aspects of the other intelligence specialties, Cryptology (SC 37) and Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (SC 36).

**48-3. Participation.** Some officers commissioned in Military Intelligence Branch will have the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Specialty designated as their primary specialty upon entry on active duty. Military Intelligence officers may, within requirements and with HQDA approval, have any of the specialties listed in chapter 2 designated as their alternate specialty except Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Field Artillery, and Infantry.

**48-4. Professional Development Objectives.** Officers entering this specialty will complete the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course which prepares officers for tactical intelligence assignments and provides knowledge of S-2/G-2 intelligence responsibilities and operations at battalion, brigade, and division level. Subsequent assignments provide for development of a balanced career through challenging operational, command and staff assignments with additional training as appropriate. Professional development phases and objectives for all specialties are discussed in chapter 2. Educational opportunities, both military and civilian, and illustrative assignment opportunities for the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Specialty are shown in figure 48-1.



## APPENDIX B

### Specialty Proponent System Objectives

The objectives of the specialty proponent system are shown below.

a. Set responsibilities throughout the Army for all specialty-related matters involved in life-cycle personnel management functions. These functions include structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, unit deployment, sustainment, professional development and separation.

b. Insure that a single agent is identified and made responsible for analysis of the functional role of all personnel in each specialty.

c. Insure that personnel management policies, programs, and procedures established by HQDA incorporate specialty-related considerations.

d. Foster achievement of the goals and objectives of the Army's OPMS, Warrant Officer career management policies and programs, and the EPMS. This includes the special branches and Reserve Components.

### Specialty Proponent Tasks

Proponent agencies will perform the following:

- (1) Gather and evaluate data.
- (2) Identify issues and initiatives.
- (3) Formulate alternatives.
- (4) Coordinate actions.

(5) Recommend policy changes to the DCSPER.

(6) Advise and assist MILPERCEN and Reserve Component Personnel Agencies. (In discharging their responsibilities, proponent agencies will deal with their specialties in a collective sense. They will not exercise any authority over individual personnel management decisions normally the responsibility of the Commander, MILPERCEN or Reserve Component Personnel Agencies.)

Source: AR 600-3 Final Draft, "The Army Specialty Proponent System" ( no date, prepared 1982).

## APPENDIX C

### GLOSSARY

**clandestine operation:** Activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and similiar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor.

**collection (acquisition):** The obtaining of information in any manner, to include direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources.

**combat information:** Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user tactical intelligence requirements.

**combat intelligence:** That knowledge of the enemy, weather and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

**combined operation:** An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

communications intelligence: Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

covert operations: Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial of the sponsor.

cryptology: The science which treats of hidden, disguised, or encrypted communications. It embraces communications security and communications intelligence.

current intelligence: Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or interpretation.

data: A representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any representations such as characters or analog, quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned.

decision: In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission.

doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

**electronics intelligence:** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

**imagery:** Collectively, the representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices or other media.

**information:** In intelligence usage, unevaluated material of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.

**intelligence:** The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

**intelligence data base:** The sum of holdings of intelligence data and finished intelligence products at a given organization.

**military strategy:** The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.

**near real time:** Delay caused by automated processing and display between the occurrence of an event and reception of data at some other location.

**operational intelligence:** Intelligence required for planning and executing all types of operations.



**photographic intelligence:** The collected products of photographic interpretation, classified and evaluated for intelligence use.

**reconnaissance:** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

**signals intelligence:** A category of intelligence information comprising all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence.

**strategic intelligence:** Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail.

**strategy:** The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.

**tactical intelligence:** Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations.

**target:** In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. An area designated and numbered for future

firing. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the target.

target acquisition: The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

telemetry intelligence: Technical intelligence information derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1979).

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Charles E. Thomann, Executive Director National Military Intelligence Association, to author, 6 January 1983.

# INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Brigadier General William Roll  
Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate  
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center  
200 Stovall Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22332
2. Brigadier General Roy M. Strom  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U.S. Army Forces Command  
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330
3. Brigadier General Sidney T. Weinstein  
Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence  
Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85612
4. Captain Joseph A. Derie II  
Combined Arms Training Integration Directorate  
U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Development Activity  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
5. Colonel Lee Badgett  
Commandant, Defense Intelligence School  
Anacostia Naval Annex  
Washington, D.C. 20374
6. Colonel Peter J. Boylan  
Chief of Staff  
82d Airborne Division  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
7. Colonel John G. Lackey, III  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
82d Airborne Division  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
8. Colonel William R. Larson  
35 17th Street #6  
Hermosa Beach, California 90254
9. Colonel John A. Pattison  
Director of Training and Doctrine  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613
10. Colonel Robert T. Smith, Jr.  
Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence  
School, Devens  
Fort Devens, Massachusetts 01433

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Commander 66th Military Intelligence Group  
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Cameron Station  
Alexandria, Virginia
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1st Battation, 31st Infantry  
2nd Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96224
15. Lieutenant Colonel James I. Dinimann  
Chief, Military Intelligence Branch  
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center  
200 Stovall Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22332
16. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd Harris  
Leadership Committee  
Department of Command  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
17. Lieutenant Colonel George E. Hunt  
Chief, Special Proponency Office  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613
18. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Schlatter  
Department of Joint and Combined Operations  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
19. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Tucker  
Department of Command  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
20. Major David J. Eggle  
Professional Development Office  
Military Intelligence Branch  
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center  
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Arlington Hall Station  
Arlington, Virginia 22212
28. Ms Joann Bolling  
Library, United States Army Intelligence Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Arizona
29. Professor Roy Godson  
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

